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LAWYERING vs. PHILOSOPHIZING:
FACTS OR FANCIES
Raoul Berger*
INTRODUCTION

A recent symposium on Michael Perry's functional justification of
judicial activism1 disclosed that his fellow activists were united in one
thing-rejection of his solution. Apart from that, they might be regarded, to paraphrase Pirandello, as ten authors in search of a theory.
One of them, Ira Lupu, sapiently observed that "[c]onstitutional scholars have, of late, talked mainly to each other"; "the time has come for
us to look outside ourselves to the audiences of judges, lawyers, legislators, and the public,"' to the vast bulk of whom, like to Chief Justice
Marshall, "abstract theorizing was never congenial.'

4

Jacques Barzun

observed that "[i]f from love of abstraction new conceptual terms are
substituted for common ones, it often happens that the power of words
* A.B., University of Cincinnati (1932); J.D., Northwestern University (1935); LL.M.,
Harvard University (1938); LL.D., University of Cincinnati (1975); LL.D., University of Michigan (1978).
I. Judicial Review and the Constitution--The Text and Beyond, 8 U. DAYTON L. REV.
443 (1983).
2. Paul Brest recently examined "seven representative scholars who favor one or another
form of fundamental rights adjudication," found that they espouse different theories revolving
around different concepts and sources of "morals," and suggested that their conclusions were derived from their particular predilections. Brest, The FundamentalRights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1067, 1089
(1981). Academicians, Mark Tushnet wrote, are "eager to superimpose a facade of rationality on
the Court's decisions." Tushnet, Truth, Justice, and the American Way: An Interpretation of
Public Law Scholarship in the Seventies, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1307, 1325 (1979).
Philip Kurland is not satisfied "by the many theories of fundamental values that my academic colleagues have recently come up with in defense of constitutional deconstruction [i.e.
noninterpretivism]. . . . In large measure, the deconstructionists are simply supplying excuses
rather than justifications for a fait accompli, the expansion of judicial power." Kurland, Curia
Regis: Some Comments on the Divine Right of Kings and Courts "To Say What the Law Is," 23
ARIz. L. REV. 581, 597 (1981). He considers that "deconstruction makes nonsense of the concept
of a written constitution." Id. at 586.
3. Lupu, Constitutional Theory and the Search for a Workable Premise, 8 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 579, 579, 580 (1983).

4.

F.

FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY AND WAITE 15

(1937).
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to direct thought approaches zero. ' '5 Familiar propositions are obscured
by philosophical jargon, and judges cannot apply what they cannot

understand.
A

PLEA FOR SOME SCHOLARLY FACT-FINDING

As the sole interpretivist contributor to the symposium, I would

stress that my fellows were not sufficiently interested in the facts crucial to the study of the Court's subversion of the Constitution. William
James worried about "the presumptuous arrogance of theories that ignore, even disdain, the concreteness of mere fact."' But, as Lawrence
Friedman explains, "Empirical research involves a lot of very grubby

hard slogging that law professors aren't trained for and don't want to
do." 7 They prefer to sit and "think," be the end product as divorced
from reality as are some of Ronald Dworkin's speculations.'
A long immersion in law practice taught me that a firm grasp of

the facts is the indispensable starting point. Intellectual curiosity, not
commitment to a cause led me to explore the legislative history of the

fourteenth amendment,' but the historical facts inexorably impelled me
to the conclusions set forth in my Government by Judiciary."'Because,
as Richard Saphire remarked, "responding to Berger's thesis has become somewhat of a cottage industry in constitutional scholarship""'-an industry more distinguished by pejoratives than historical
competence-I may be allowed to set forth the narrow scope of my

5. J. BARZUN, A STROLL WITH WILLIAM JAMES 60 (1983). While scientists like T.H. Huxley, J.B.S. Haldane, and P.B. Medawar "demonstrate a deep commitment to demystification of
science by cutting through jargon," Gould, The Pleasures of Rereading, N.Y. Times, June 12,
1983, § 7 (Book Review), at 14, col. 3, our jural philosophers lose us in a jungle of jargon.
William James was "'impatient with the awful abstract rigmarole in which our philosophers
obscure the truth,'" he regarded "the failure to write intelligibly a fundamental flaw in any vision," and he considered Hegel "'beset with a perverse preference for the use of technical and
logical jargon.'" J. BARZUN, supra, at 137, 133, 125.
6. Coles, A Passionate Commitment to Experience, N.Y. Times, May 29, 1983, § 7 (Book
Review), at 7, col. 3.
7. Margolick, The'Trouble with America's Law Schools, N.Y. Times, May 22, 1983, § 6
(Magazine), at 30, col. 3. Henry Monaghan notes that many law professors in the present generation have little interest in history. They "are problem solvers by training. Their eyes are on the
present, not the past. By disposition, therefore, they are unsympathetic to being bound by the
chains of the past." Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353, 378 (1981).
8. Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 486-87 (1981).
9. Back in 1942, I indicated that I liked it no better when Justice Black incorporated my
predilections in the Constitution than when the Four Horsemen embodied theirs. Berger, Constructive Contempt: A Post-Mortem, 9 U. CHI. L. REV. 602 (1942). For me, constitutionality
never turned on whose ox was gored.
10.

R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH

AMENDMENT (1977).
11. Saphire, Judicial Review in the Name of the Constitution, 8 U. DAYTON L. REV. 745,
753 (1983).
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thesis. Unlike my fellow contributors, I attempted no general theory of
constitutional construction, but stated in my opening pages,
[T]he proof is all but incontrovertible that the framers meant to leave
control of suffrage with the States, which had always exercised such control, and to exclude federal intrusion. . . .If that [unmistakable] intention is demonstrable, the "one man, one vote" cases represent .. .[a]

180-degree revision, taking from the States a power that unmistakably
was left to them. That poses the stark issue whether such revisory power
was conferred on the Court."a
This central issue is all but ignored by the symposiasts, yet it poses the
problem of judicial usurpation in boldest relief. The activists have not
come to grips with my evidence respecting the Framers' exclusion of
suffrage and segregation from the fourteenth amendment. Instead,
their writings, Mark Tushnet considers, are "plainly designed to protect the legacy of the Warren Court. .

.

.[I]ntellectually the very no-

tion of the rule of law, [is] at issue." ' A perfervid activist, Paul Brest,
pleads with academe to "simply acknowledge that most of our writings
[about judicial review] are not political theory but advocacy scholarship-amicus briefs ultimately designed to persuade the Court to adopt
our various notions of the public good.""'
The time has come for some lawyerly fact-finding. So long as the
historical facts are in dispute, real progress toward clarification will be
nil. To facilitate fact-finding by others let me briefly summarize the
facts relating to suffrage and segregation. The accuracy of these facts,
as will appear, is virtually undisputed. Justice Brennan observed that
17 or 19 Northern States had rejected black suffrage between 1865 and
1868.15 Consequently, Roscoe Conkling stated, it would be "futile to
ask three-quarters of the States to do.

.

.the very thing which most of

them have already refused to do."" Another member of the Joint
Committee on Reconstruction, Senator Jacob Howard, said, "[three
fourths of the States of this Union could not be induced to vote to grant
the right of suffrage. 1 7 The chairman of the Joint Committee, Senator
William Fessenden, said of a suffrage proposal that there is "not the
slightest probability that it will be adopted by the States." ' The unani-

R. BERGER, supra note 10, at 7, 8.
13. Tushnet, Legal Realism, Structural Review and Prophecy, 8 U. DAYTON L. REV.809,
811 (1983).
14. Brest, supra note 2, at 1109.
15. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 256 (1970) (Brennan, White, and Marshall, JJ.,
dissenting).
16. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 358 (1866).
17. Id. at 2766.
18. Id. at 704.
12.
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mous Report of the Joint Committee doubted that "the States would
consent to surrender a power they had exercised, and to which they
were attached," and therefore thought it best to "leave the whole question with the people of each State." 19 That such was the vastly preponderant opinion is confirmed by a remarkable fact. During the pendency

of ratification, radical opposition to the readmission of Tennessee because its constitution excluded Negro suffrage was voted down in the
House 125 to 12. Senator Charles Sumner's parallel proposal was rejected 34 to 4.20 The fifteenth amendment was later adopted, as its
Framers stated, to fill the gap left by the failure of the fourteenth to
ban discriminatory exclusion from suffrage." His own masterly collection of the historical facts led Justice Harlan to conclude that the argu-

ment for reapportionment flew "in the face of irrefutable and still unanswered history to the contrary. '2 And Louis Lusky considers that
Harlan's demonstration is "irrefutable and unrefuted."' Gerald Gunther wrote that "most constitutional lawyers agree" that the "one per-

son-one vote" lacks all historical justification,
now accept my demonstration.

5

24

and a bevy of activists

Summing up, Robert Bork, now a

19.

S. REP. No. 112, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 13, 8 (1866) (Joint Committee on ReconstrucAMENDMENTS' DEBATES 94 (1967). Justice
Frankfurter stated, "It has never been questioned in this Court that committee reports, as well as
statements by those in charge of a bill or of a report, are authoritative elucidations of the scope of
a measure." Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 399-400 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
20. For details, see R. BERGER, supra note 10, at 56, 59-60, 79.
21. For citations, see Berger, The Fourteenth Amendment: Light from the Fifteenth, 74
Nw. U.L. REV. 311, 321-23 nn.61-76 (1979). The Supreme Court stated that before adoption of
the fifteenth amendment, a State could "exclude citizens of the United States from voting on
account of race .... " The "amendment has invested the citizens of the United States with a new
constitutional right ...." United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 217, 218 (1875).
22. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
23. Lusky, "Government by Judiciary": What Price Legitimacy?, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
403, 406 (1979).
24. Gunther, Too Much a Battle with Strawmen, Wall St. J., Nov. 25, 1977, at 4, col. 4.
These are not "snippets from the historical record." Leedes, A Critique of Illegitimate Noninterpretivism, 8 U. DAYTON L. REv. 533, 536 (1983).
25. Abraham, "Equal Justice under Law" or "Justice at any Cost"? The Federal Role
Revisited: Reflection on Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 467, 468 (1978); Alfange, On Judicial Policymaking and
Constitutional Change: Another Look at the "Original Intention" Theory of Interpretation, 5
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 603, 622 (1978); Lusky, supra note 23; Mendelson, Raoul Berger's Fourteenth Amendment-Abuse by Contraction vs. Abuse by Expansion, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
437, 452-53 (1979); Nathanson, Book Review, 56 TEX. L. REV. 579, 581 (1978); Perry, Book
Review, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 685, 687 (1978).
Paul Brest remarks, "[T]he adopters of the equal protection clause probably intended it not
to encompass voting discrimination at all." Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV. 204, 234 n. 115 (1980). See also infra text accompanying notes 45,
47.

tion), reprinted in A. AVINS, THE RECONSTRUCTION
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member of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, stated,
"The principle of one man, one vote.

. .

runs counter to the text of the

fourteenth amendment, the history surrounding its adoption and ratification and the political practice of Americans from Colonial times up
to the day the Court invented the new formula.""8
Little less convincing is the case for exclusion of segregation. Richard Kluger, who wrote a laudatory history of Brown v. Board of Education, asked, "Could it be reasonably claimed that segregation had
been outlawed by the Fourteenth when the yet more basic emblem of

citizenship---the ballot-had been withheld from the Negro under that
amendment?" 2 7 James Wilson, chairman of the House Judiciary Com-

mittee, assured the House that the terms of the Civil Rights Bill, which
it was the purpose of the fourteenth amendment to incorporate 28 did
not mean that the children of "all citizens shall attend the same
schools. '2"9 The Framers' widespread assumption, recorded in the debates, was that black children would attend separate schools,30 if only,

as Alexander Bickel explained, because "[iut was preposterous to worry
about unsegregated schools, for example, when hardly a beginning had
been made at educating Negroes at all and when obviously special efforts, suitable only for Negroes, would have to be made.

'31

As late as

1875, Senator Sumner, who unceasingly had pressed for mixed schools,
failed to persuade the Senate, prepared to accept equal accommodations in inns and transportation, to include schools, it being openly acknowledged that it would kindle bitter prejudice.3 2 Nathaniel Nathan-

26. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 18
(1971). Saphire agrees with Brest that "'hopes for scientific objectivity in legal interpretation are
on a par with the fantasy of a single, objective reading of Hamlet or of Balinese culture.'"
Saphire, supra note 11, at 803 n.21 1 (quoting Brest, Interpretation and Interest, 34 STAN. L.
REv. 765, 711 (1982) (footnote omitted)). Brest is intoxicated by his own rhetoric, for a single
objective reading of the suffrage data, considered as "irrefutable" by Brest's "beloved Mentor"
Justice Harlan, is worlds removed from a "single, objective reading of Hamlet." Of such history,
one cannot justly charge the "fussy interpretivists ... substitute snippets from the historical record, and for inferences, they lean heavily upon their own dogmatic preconceptions." Leedes,
supra note 24, at 536. Leedes' dictum, "There is not necessarily only one right answer to a question of constitutional law," id. at 537, surely cannot apply to the Framers' exclusion of suffrage.
27. R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 635 (1976).
28. R. BERGER, supra note 10, at 22-23.
29. Id. at 27 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1117 (1866) (statement of
James Wilson, then chairman of the House Judiciary Committee)).
30. Id. at 125-26.
31. Id. at 100 (quoting R. KLUGER, supra note 27, at 654). In 1962, Bickel wrote that
"[t]he framers did not intend or expect then and there to outlaw segregation, which, of course,
was a practice widely prevalent in the North." A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 100
(1962).
32. Berger, supra note 21, at 329-31. Compare with such facts Ronald Dworkin's reverie
about what an 1866 Framer might intend respecting segregation: "I don't know what the right
answer is to the question of what we've done. . . . Nor do I, as it happens, have any particular
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son, himself an activist, wrote that Alexander Bickel conclusively
demonstrated that the fourteenth amendment "would not require
school desegregation" and that "Berger's independent research and
analysis confirms and adds weight to those conclusions." 3 Michael
Perry concluded that "the legislative history of the fourteenth amendment clearly discloses that the Framers did not mean for the amendment to have any effect on segregated public schooling or on segregation generally."3 4 And although Sanford Levinson supports the Brown
result, he acknowledges that it "cannot plausibly be thought to derive
in its entirety from the unamended Constitution itself, and judicial
supremacy in the absence of such derivation does continue to exhibit
overtones of Platonic guardianship." 5
Lupu has it that Perry endorses Berger's views "because they serve
extremely well his argument strategy of seeking to convince himself
and persuade others that interpretivism is an untenable position in the
late twentieth century" 3 -illustrating the familiar courtroom tactic: if
you can't meet the evidence, impeach the witness. I met Perry only
once, and though we sharply disagree on cardinal points, I was struck
by his intellectual integrity and high-mindedness. Such a man would
not warp his views to prevail in a debate, particularly when other activists share them. Lupu also states, "Perry reveals no effort to confirm or
deny Berger's view; no original fourteenth amendment historical research appears in text or footnotes. . . . Berger's interpretations are
tremendously controversial and have been widely challenged." 3 7 Now

preferences myself, either way, about segregated schools. I haven't thought much about that either." Dworkin, supra note 8, at 486-87.
Thomas Pangle comments:
[T]he account of human rights Dworkin offers turns out to be little more than a convoluted
ideology supporting precisely those reactions to current policy issues that a conventional
liberal academician is likely to have.
• ..One might expect, however, that he would not so cavalierly dress up his own
opinions as "natural rights" or call the culture-bound process by which he arrives at them
"Philosophy."
Pangle, Book Review, 50 PuB. INTEREST 157, 159-60 (1978).
33. Nathanson, supra note 25, at 581.
34. Perry, Interpretivism, Freedom of Expression, and Equal Protection, 42 OHIO ST. L.J.
261, 292 (1981). See also Abraham, supra note 25; Alfange, supra note 25; Brest, supra note 25;
Tushnet, supra note 13; infra text accompanying note 147.
35. Levinson, The Turn Toward Functionalism in Constitutional Theory, 8 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 567, 578 (1983).
36. Lupu, supra note 3, at 584. Leedes accepts my finding that suffrage was not guaranteed
by the fourteenth amendment. See infra text accompanying note 50. Sanford Levinson finds Perry
persuasive that the Warren Court's "vision cannot plausibly be thought to derive in its entirety
from the unamended Constitution itself, and judicial supremacy in the absence of such derivation
does continue to exhibit overtones of Platonic guardianship." Levinson, supra note 35, at 578.
37. Lupu, supra note 3. at 584 (emphasis added).
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Perry, in a lengthy book review, painstakingly tested my "interpretations" by accepted canons.3 8 Where is Lupu's comparable "effort to
confirm or deny Berger's view"; where is his own "historical research"?
Lupu himself disparages one who "with little serious argument of his
own" dismisses the work of others.8 9 In great part the "challenges" to
which he refers, by such as Paul Brest who immediately aligned me
with "racists" because I undercut his view of Brown v. Board of Education,'0 the activist Ark of the Covenant, led Henry Monaghan to say,
"Berger's uncomfortable and unfashionable analysis is an important
one. It will not do, as some have already done, to brush it aside in a
peremptory manner. '"41
It will clarify the ongoing debate and set the stage for evaluation
of Lupu's charge that my interpretations are widely challenged to show
that the challenges exhibit pretty shoddy scholarship, and that my
views increasingly find acceptance by activists. 2 The latest, Sanford
Levinson, wrote of attempts to construct a defense of the modern ,cases,
"[I]t is naive to pretend that the construction will be an easy task or
that we can so easily shed the view of the Constitution, and its limits,
articulated by Berger.' '
More ambivalent than Lupu, Richard Saphire records that Paul

38. Perry, supra note 25.
39. Lupu, supra note 3, at 585.
40. Brest, Berger v. Brown et. al., N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1977, § 7 (Book Review), at 10,
col. 3. [hereinafter cited as Brest, Berger v. Brown]. He was dismayed that I challenged "the
entire network of constitutional decisions underlying our legal commitment to racial equality." Id.
But he has since acknowledged that "the adopters of the equal protection clause probably intended it not to encompass voting discrimination at all." See Brest, supra note 25. He also concedes that "the nation was not ready to eliminate [segregation] in the 1960's." Brest, Berger v.
Brown, supra, at 11. He admits that an amendment in the mid-50's to require school desegregation would have failed. Brest, supra note 25, at 237. He now notes that activists acknowledge that
the fundamental "rights at stake ... are not specified by the text or original history of the Constitution." Brest, supra note 2, at 1064. An "existing precedent can be undermined when its justification proves to be historically incorrect." Leedes, supra note 24, at 545.
41. Monaghan, The Constitution Goes to Harvard, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 117, 124
(1978). For activists, Brown is the "touchstone of constitutional theory." Lynch, Book Review, 63
CORNELL

L.

REV.

1091, 1099 n.32 (1978). The

modern liberal mind just cannot imagine turning the clock back to the days before Brown
v. Board of Education . . .because of the fundamental fairness and simple justice for
which Brown stands. But as Berger suggests, if the Supreme Court's purpose is to establish
justice without reference to the original intent of the framers, then what remains to circumscribe judicial power? Berger's critics have singularly unsatisfactory answers to this
question.
Kommers, Book Review, 40 REv. OF POL. 409, 413 (1978).
42. For painstaking assessments of the debate, which award the palm to me, see Bridwell,
The Scope of Judicial Review: A Dirgefor the Theorists of Majority Rule?, 31 S.C.L. REV. 617
(1980); Gangi, Judicial Expansionism: An Evaluation of the Ongoing Debate, 8 OHio N.U.L.
REV. 1 (1981).
43. Levinson, Book Review, NATION, Feb. 26, 1983, at 248, 250.
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. selective, and ex-

aggerated";"" that Aviam Soifer claims that Berger's book "contains
very poor history . misleading."'4 6 But Soifer grudgingly allows that
"Berger is probably correct in arguing that suffrage was not deemed a
civil right in 1866 . . . and a majority of the 39th Congress, if they
gave any thought to it at all, might not then have included a right to
integrated schooling in their definition of civil rights."" A "scholar"
who questions whether the Framers "gave any thought

. . .

at all" to

segregation in light of the above-noted historical facts, either betrays
blinding bias or sheer incompetence. Dimond likewise concedes that
the exclusion of suffrage "does have support in the text and structure of
the fourteenth amendment. ' 48 So Soifer and Dimond admit the veracity of my centralfinding-the Framers'exclusion of suffrage. Another
"challenger," Paul Brest, wrote, "the adopters of the equal protection
clause probably intended not to encompass voting discrimination at
all."'' 9 And Leedes agrees that "[n]either the Civil Rights Act of 1866
nor the fourteenth amendment conferred or guaranteed political
rights." 50 So there is no "tremendous controversy" as to my central
thesis but rather an admission of the historical facts I collated. The
proof as to the exclusion of segregation is little less convincing and
widely accepted. These determinations by the Framers afford a shining
opportunity to examine the Court's undeniable revision of the fourteenth amendment in these respects, without waiting for formulation of
a "general" theory of interpretation.
Saphire likewise calls attention to Judge John Gibbons' "critique,"
a glaring example of the argument ad hominem: Berger "is neither
talented enough as an advocate nor knowledgeable enough as a historian to be taken seriously in either discipline." 51 Gibbons dismisses aca44. Saphire, supra note 11, at 753.
45. Id. at 753 n.48 (quoting Soifer, infra note 46, at 654).
46. Soifer, Protecting Civil Rights: A Critique of Raoul Berger's History, 54 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 651, 705 (1979) (emphasis added).
47. For details of Soifer's incompetence, see Berger, Soifer to the Rescue of History, 32
S.C.L. REV. 427 (1981).
48. Dimond, Strict Construction and Judicial Review of Racial Discrimination under the
Equal Protection Clause: Meeting Raoul Berger on Interpretivist Grounds, 80 MICH. L. REV.
462, 472 n.46 (1982). For Dimond's incapacity to weigh evidence, see infra text accompanying
notes 71-79. See also Berger, Paul Dimond Fails to "Meet Berger on Interpretivist Grounds," 43
OHIO ST.

L.J. 285 (1982).

49. Brest, supra note 25.
50. Leedes, supra note 24, at 554 n.142.
51. Saphire, supra note 11, at 753 n.48 (citing Gibbons, Book Review, 31 RUTGERS L. REV.
839, 854 (1978)). To put it mildly, Gibbons proved that historical scholarship is not his metier.
See Berger, "Government by Judiciary".Judge Gibbons' Argument Ad Hominem, 59 B.U.L.
REV. 783 (1979). Consider his counsel not to bury ourselves in the pages of the Congressional
Globe (which recorded the drafting debates), but rather to look to the fact that "universal man-
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demic praise for my prior books-Impeachment, Executive Privi' 52
lege-because they were merely useful tools in the "political arena,
that is, they served to help topple Nixon-a fine tribute to scholarly
integrity! But my first book, Congress v. The Supreme Court, could not

be employed in the "political arena," and though it criticized a dozen
views of Alexander Bickel it elicited from him an encomium: Berger
"offers much fresh interpretation and insight. . . .He is always deeply

informed and powerful, and altogether convincing in his basic conten-

tion." 58 What suddenly happened to Berger's competence; why was he
no longer capable of writing "good" history when he turned from the
legitimacy of judicial review to its scope? It was not because like the

activists I was wedded to a particular cause." In fact, in a number of
particulars my conclusions ran counter to my predilections. The explanation is that history which undermined Brown must be discredited at
all costs. Saphire nevertheless refers to Gibbons' critique "which re-

hood suffrage was a potent revolutionary ideal," Gibbons, supra, at 852-53, overlooking an
equally potent and more immediately influential contemporary tenet-the belief that Negroes constituted an "inferior race." Berger, supra, at 808. It is a peculiar approach to interpretation which
accords greater weight to a "revolutionary ideal" than to the Framers' incontrovertible determination to exclude suffrage and segregation. Today communism is sweeping the world, but that
hardly empowers the Court to impose a communist system on the American people. Of a similar
argument by Perry that "recognition of human rights as a concern in international covenants
somehow validates congressional power over matters of human rights," Lupu observes that "[tihe
Congress of the United States does not derive its power from the process or substance of international relations." Lupu, supra note 3,at 608 n.141 (citing M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE
COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 132 n.* (1982)).
52. See Gibbons, supra note 51, at 839. See also Berger, supra note 51, at 783 n.5.
53. Bickel, Book Review, 75 AM. HIST. REV. 1509, 1509-10 (1970). John Burleigh wrote of
my Government by Judiciary that it is "carefully documented and vigorously argued, at once
learned, illuminating, and challenging." Burleigh, Book Review, 50 Pua. INTEREST 151, 153
(1978). David Richards cites my Congress v. The Supreme Court for the proposition that a
Learned Hand argument "is very probably historically false." Richards, The Aims of Constitutional Theory, 8 U. DAYTON L. REV. 723, 728 (1983) (citing R. BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE
SUPREME COURT

(1969)).

A candid activist, Larry Alexander, wrote, "Berger has quite convincingly demonstrated that
the bulk of modern judicial decisions under the fourteenth amendment cannot be justified by
reference to what the drafters of that amendment believed the amendment would accomplish."
Alexander, Modern Equal Protection Theories: A Metatheoretical Taxonomy and Critique, 42
OHIO ST. L.J. 3,4 (1981).
Reviewing my recent Death Penalties: The Supreme Court's Obstacle Course, activist Sanford Levinson wrote, "I would like to think that Berger's arguments could be easily disregarded.
But the issues he raises cannot be dismissed." Levinson, supra note 43, at 249; see supra text
accompanying note 43.
Compare Saphire's citation of Walter Murphy's criticism of "what he perceived as Berger's
selective parsing of the legislative history and concluded that 'Berger's style of reasoning is often
that of the clever college debater rather than that of the careful scholar.' " Saphire, supra note 11,
at 756 n.58 (quoting Murphy, Book Review, 87 YALE L.J. 1752, 1756 (1978)). See also infra
note 69.
54. See supra note 9.
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futes Berger's historical conclusions" and condemns Berger's study as a
"'narrow, confused, partisan example of special pleading.' "115 To "refute" is to demonstrate the falsity of a proposition, whereas Gibbons
merely demonstrated that judicial robes do not a scholar make.
Saphire adverts to the "extraordinary impact" made by my book
on contemporary constitutional theory.e If its history is as "poor" as
Soifer and Gibbons allege, it should have been blown out of the water,
dismissed as of no moment. Instead, five years after publication, Dimond obtained subventions from the Ford Foundation, the Carnegie
Foundation, and the Michigan Law School to "refute" Berger's history, 57 attesting his belief that Soifer, Gibbons, et. al. had not done the
job. As Eric Foner wrote of a similar "controversy," the criticized thesis "remains important precisely because a generation of scholars has
directed its energies to overturning it." 5
Although Saphire notes some of my replies, he gives no sign of
having read them. Perry, who did read them, considered that they were
"generally effective rebuttals" of the historical criticisms.5 9 One who
only reads critiques without weighing replies is like a judge who decides on reading the briefs for one side only. A word as to Soifer et al.
Nowadays one achieves instant rank as an "authority" merely by getting published-particularly if the author criticizes Berger; activists
take in each other's washing. In scholarship, as in other walks of life,
however, some are better than others. Who would rank Dimond and
Soifer, who have yet to establish themselves as authorities on constitutional law, with those who share my conclusion that suffrage and/or
segregation were excluded from the fourteenth amendment. There is

first Justice Harlan, who set out the evidence respecting the exclusion
of suffrage in masterly fashion. 0 Then there are Philip Kurland, 61 Lord
Beloff (Oxford emeritus),'6 Willard Hurst, 6" Gerald Gunther," Na-

55. Saphire, supra note 11, at 753 n.48 ,(quoting Gibbons, supra note 51. at 845).
56. Id. at 752.
57. Dimond, supra note 48, at 462.
58. Foner, N.Y. Times, May 23, 1982, § 7 (Book Review), at 11, 27, col. 2. "The old guard
said with confidence that the Jamesian propositions could hardly be taken seriously, a conclusion that was somewhat flawed by the long and serious arguments written to prove it." J. BARzuN,
supra note 5, at 2.
59. Perry, supra note 34, at 285 n.100.
60. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
61. Berger has done it again. His two preceding volumes on executive privilege and impeachment afforded the nation historical basis for addressing the primary constitutional
issues of the constitutional crisis that was Watergate. Now he affords a similarly important
historical effort addressed at. . .the usurpation by the judiciary of general governmental
powers on the pretext that its authority derives from the Fourteenth Amendment.
Letter to Harvard University Press (August 15, 1977).
62. Beloff, Book Review, The Times (London), April 7, 1978, (Higher Education Supp.), at
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thaniel Nathanson,6" Alexander Bickel, 66 Robert Bork,67 Wallace Mendelson, Henry Abraham, 68 and Michael Perry. Do a Soifer, Dimond,
Gibbons, and Walter Murphy 9 tip the scales? Is this a measure of a
"tremendous controversy"? Despite the denigratory remarks of Dimond-Gibbons-Soifer, Saphire concludes (in a later footnote) that
"Berger's work unquestionably represents some of the most comprehensive and detailed research yet undertaken concerning the historical
background of the fourteenth amendment. At the very least, Berger's
historical conclusions must be deemed plausible.""0
Nevertheless Dimond carries weight with him; he cites Dimond to
illuminate the problem how to determine the intent of the Framers:
For example, Professor Dimond traces Representative John Bingham's
political career, including positions he took as a county prosecutor in
1846, his support for Zachary Taylor's nomination in 1848, and his
"turn toward the Western Reserve philosophy" in 1854, in support of his

claim that Bingham, as a principal actor in the framing of the fourteenth
amendment, advocated a broad conception of civil rights.7 1

The Framers were not swayed by a record of Bingham's prior sympathies but by what he said in the debates. There (1) he objected to the
"no discrimination" language of the Civil Rights Bill because it would
"embrace every right . . .including political rights," because it was

"oppressive," "unjust," and would abolish the state constitutions. 2
That the Framers were influenced by this is exemplified by their deletion of the objectionable language, to obviate, as Chairman Wilson explained, "a latitudinarian construction not intended. '7' For "civil
rights" Bingham substituted "privileges or immunities" 74 in the amendI.
63. "This is a major piece of work, and a very illuminating one." R. BERGER, supra note 10,
at dust jacket.
64. See supra text accompanying note 24.
65. See supra text accompanying note 33.
66. See supra text accompanying note 31.
67. See supra text accompanying note 26.
68. See supra note 25.
69. For a demonstration of Murphy's distortions and misrepresentations, see Berger, The
Scope of Judicial Review and Walter Murphy, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 341. Because of his ad
hominem tone: "Berger's argument relies far less on 'brute facts' about whatever it was the framers intended and more on incomplete research and gossamery guesses about what they may have
had in mind," Murphy, Book Review, 87 YALE L.J. 1752, 1768 n.81 (1979), I cannot resist the
temptation to recount that a noted historian who read my reply commented that Murphy "should
stick to writing novels."
70. Saphire, supra note 11, at 777 n.126.
71. Id. at 774 n.115 (citing Dimond, supra note 48, at 481-94).
72. See R. BERGER, supra note 10, at 120.
73. Id. at 114 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1366 (1886)).
74. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 172-73 (1979) (Harlan, J., dissenting).

Published by eCommons, 1983

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 9:2

ment, words of art of restricted meaning borrowed from article IV. 75
(2) In an early version of the amendment, provision was made for both
"the same political rights and privileges and . . . equal protection in
the enjoyment of life, liberty and property." Bingham proposed a substitute that omitted "political rights and privileges" and was confined
to "equal protection . . .of life, liberty and property. '76 (3) Bingham
"himself had rather consistently voted against proposals for direct and
immediate enfranchisement." ' 7 (4) Bingham defended Tennessee's exclusion of Negro suffrage in 1867, saying "justice for all is not to be
secured in a day."178 (5) He stated, "[W]e all agree . . . that the exercise of the elective franchise . . . is exclusively under the control of the
States. . . . The amendment does not give, as the second section
shows, the power of regulating suffrage in the several States. ' 79 Compare this example, one of many, with Dimond's charge that "Berger's
reading of the legislative history . . . was unduly restrictive, selective,
and exaggerated." 8 0 In maintaining that statements in the very process
of drafting are outweighed by what Bingham said outside the halls of
Congress years before, Dimond betrays that he simply has not learned
to weigh evidence and is unschooled in statutory construction.
Another example points up the need for settling the facts to dispel
the cloud of "tremendous controversy." Although Gary Leedes' article
is free of the invective that disfigures the polemics of Gibbons and
Soifer, I am constrained to differ with his version of the historical facts.
He considers that "[t]he loose language of the fourteenth amendment,
which was proposed by Congress was a standing invitation for innovative interpretation." ' Was "due process of law" "loose language"?

75. Berger, Incorporationof the Bill of Rights: A Reply to Michael Curtis' Response, 44
OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 7-8 (1983).
76. 400 U.S. at 171, 172-73. "Neither the Civil Rights Act of 1866 nor the fourteenth
amendment conferred or guaranteed political rights." Leedes, supra note 24, at 554 n.142.
77. 400 U.S. at 173.
78. R. BERGER, supra note 10, at 111 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist
Sess. 3979

(1866)).
79. Id. at 65 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2542 (1866)).
80. Saphire, supra note 11, at 753 (citing Dimond, supra note 48, at 501-02). Saphire
likewise cites Dimond's argument "that '[t]he legislative debates from 1864 through 1875 concerning civil rights, antidiscrimination, and Reconstruction reveal much . . .passion, prejudice,
and politics'--'complicating factors [which] merely add to the difficulty in divining any narrowly
confined, but generally agreed-upon, intent of the framers.'" Id. at 782 n.142 (quoting Dimond,
supra note 48, at 507 n.244). The pervasive prejudice against blacks plainly motivated the Framers' determination to bar suffrage and desegregation. "Politics" and "passion" certainly led state
after state to reject suffrage, and members of Congress would not risk "drowning" in the hostile
stream. Infra text accompanying note 216. It is dispiriting that Saphire should take such drivel
seriously.
81. Leedes, supra note 24, at 556. Alexander refers to "some dubious invitation from the
Framers to transcend the specific values they embodied in various constitutional clauses." Alexan-
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Charles Curtis, an admirer of the Court's innovations, yet wrote that
meaning of due process of law in the fifth amendment "was as fixed
and definite as the common law could make a phrase

. .

. It meant a

procedural due process." 8 The phrase was used in the fourteenth
amendment, the Court stated, "in the same sense and with no greater
extent."8 " John Bingham, the amendment's draftsman, said that its
meaning had been settled "long ago" by the courts:84 and but for what
John Hart Ely justly labels a couple of aberrational cases,8 5 that meaning was universally procedural. So far as the Framers were concerned,
"due process" was not a "loose" term, but one of fixed and narrow
meaning. 86
"Privileges or immunities," in briefest summary, was drawn from
the "privileges and immunities" of article IV-themselves taken over
from the similar article IV of the Articles of Confederation-which
gave out-of-state migrants the right to own realty and similar rights of
"trade and commerce," and were so construed by a couple of early
state cases.87 Thus by 1866 "privileges and immunities" were words of
art.88 Justice Bradley declared in 1870 that "the civil rights bill was
enacted at the same session, and but shortly after the presentation of
the fourteenth amendment; . . . the first section of the bill covers the

same ground as the fourteenth amendment ....

-8' The bill and resul-

der, Painting without The Numbers: NoninterpretiveJudicial Review, 8 U. DAYTON L. REv. 447,
447 (1983). See also R. BERGER, supra note 10, at 99-116.
82. Curtis, Review and Majority Rule, in SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME RULE 170, 177
(E. Cahn ed. 1954). On the eve of the Convention, Hamilton stated, "The words 'due process'
have a precise technical import, and are only applicable to the process and proceedings of courts
of law." 4 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 35 (H. Syrett & J. Cooke eds. 1961).
For confirmation of Hamilton's remark, see Berger, "Law of the Land" Reconsidered, 74
Nw. U.L. REV. 1 (1979). Charles G. Haines wrote that in England due process of law referred to
"a method of procedure in criminal trials." When the clause was inserted into American state
constitutions, "it was accepted with the usual English significance" and "not regarded as a check
on legislative authority." C. HAINES, THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 410 (2d
rev. ed. 1959).
83. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 535 (1884).
84. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1089 (1866).
85. J.H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 16, 18 (1980).

86. At another point Leedes says, "The framers of the fourteenth amendment also adopted
broad language, knowing full well that the Court's previous interpretations of the Constitution's
broad provisions were often creative." Leedes, supra note 24, at 553. The Framers bitterly resented the Court's "political" decisions. See R. BERGER, DEATH PENALTIES: THE SUPREME
COURT'S OBSTACLE COURSE 169-70 (1982). John Bingham, draftsman of the amendment, flatly
rejected a broad provision that would permit a "latitudinarian" interpretation. See supra text
accompanying notes 72-73.
87.

For citations and more details, see R.

BERGER,

supra note 86, at 94.

88. Id. See also Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 319 (1956).
89. Live-Stock Dealers' & Butchers' Ass'n v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing & Slaughter-House Co., 15 F. Cas. 649, 655 (C.C.D. La. 1870) (No. 8,408). "The legislative history of the

1866 Act clearly indicates that Congress intended to protect a limited category of rights ....
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tant Act had a very narrow compass.
Leedes considers, however, that the "concept 'privileges and immunities' is so broad that Judge Bushrod Washington . . .was unable
to enumerate all the rights that are comprehended" by the article IV
prototype, 90 though he found therein the right to vote, but excluded the
right to dredge for oysters! Although Leedes notes that the clause "was
intended specifically to constitutionalize the few rights that were identified in the Civil Rights Act of 1866," he states (incompatibly in my
view) it was "chosen to encourage a latitudinarian construction of the
fourteenth amendment by the courts," 1 a statement in flat contradiction of Chairman Wilson's assurance that "civil rights" was deleted to
obviate a latitudinarian construction." s The fact that "most radicals
construed the term 'privileges and immunities' in a far-reaching way" 9
adds nothing, for "the nonradicals had enacted their program with the
sullen acquiescence of some radicals and over the opposition of
many."9 4
Citing Berger, Leedes remarks that the "privileges and immunities
clause was chosen . . . to secure adequate racial equality." 95 The cited
pages deal with Congress' power under section 5 to enforce the provisions of the amendment, not with their content." My book stressed
that "racial equality" was limited to the few rights enumerated in the
Civil Rights Act.97 Leedes himself acknowledges that "[w]hen the
fourteenth amendment was debated, a full measure of equal rights for
the emancipated slaves was not contemplated for the short run." 98
Time after time, proposals to ban all racial discrimination were re-

Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 791 (1966).
90. Leedes, supra note 24, at 553-54 (footnote omitted).
91. Id. at 554 (emphasis added).
92. See supra text accompanying note 73. Leedes notes that the substitute "phrase 'privileges and immunities' came from Representative John A. Bingham." Leedes, supra note 24, at
554 n.144.
93. Leedes, supra note 24, at 554 n.145.
94.
M. BENEDICT, A COMPROMISE OF PRINCIPLE: CONGRESSIONAL REPUBLICANS AND RECONSTRUCTION 1863-1869, at 237 (1975). See R. BERGER, supra note 10, at 234-39.

95. Leedes, supra note 24, at 554.
96. Leedes remarks that if "very little modern constitutional protection of individual rights
against states rests on the fourteenth amendment [Leedes himself states there are no extraconstitutional minority rights. Leedes, The Supreme Court Mess, 57 TEx. L. REV. 1361, 1395 (1979)],
then Congress lacks power to enforce such rights . .."L.
.eedes, supra note 24, at 607. Of course.
It may enforce only the "provisions" of the amendment. "There is no power delegated to Congress
under . . . the enforcement provisions of the Civil War Amendments to enact legislation enforcing
values not constitutionalized." Alexander, supra note 81, at 458.
97. For a summary of the historical background of the equal protection clause, see R. BERGER, supra note 86, at 197-200.
98. Leedes, supra note 24, at 554.
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jected." Nor was it the Framers' intention to give the Court a blank
check for the long run.10 0 In 1977 Bickel wrote, "The Framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment explicitly rejected the option of an open-ended
grant to Congress to meddle with conditions within the states, so as to
render them equal in accordance
with Congress' [and a fortiori, the
10 1
Court's] own notions.
Leedes errs again in stating that "Congress feared that the Court
might be sympathetic to the states' rights point of view." 102 In fact, the
Framers clung to states' rights. Typically, Roscoe Conkling, a member
of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, stated, "The proposition to
prohibit States from denying civil or political rights to any class of persons encounters a great objection on the threshold. It trenches upon the
principle of existing local sovereignty." '0 Similar statements evidencing the Framers' attachment to state sovereignty are too numerous to
reiterate.1 °4 Justice Miller declared in the Slaughter-House Cases,
"Under the pressure of all the excited feeling growing out of the war,
our statesmen have still believed that the existence of the States with
powers for domestic and local government . . . was essential to the
working of our complex form of government.
... 05 And the Court
refused to embrace a construction of the amendment that would subject the states' local concerns to "the control of Congress."' "
It is therefore surprising that Leedes should rely on Justice Bradley's statement, in solitary dissent, that the amendment attempted to
express "'the strong National yearning'" that every citizen might have
"'the full enjoyment of every right and privilege belonging to a freeman.' 99107 "Bradley's generous interpretation of the fourteenth amendment," Leedes continues, "was consistent with a shift in the balance of
power between the federal government and the states." 1 " That was not
how his fellow Justices read the will of the Framers. When it came to
specifics, moreover, Bradley said that the (narrow) first section of the
Civil Rights Act "covers the same ground as the Fourteenth Amend-

99. R. BERGER, supra note 10, at 163-64.
100. For analysis of the "open-ended" phraseology argument, see id. at 99-116.
101. A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 48 (1978).
102. Leedes, supra note 24, at 555.
103. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 358, 391 (1866).
104. See R. BERGER, supra note 10, at 60-64. Alfred Kelly, an apologist for the Warren
Court, wrote the "commitment to traditional state-federal relations meant, [that) the radical Negro reform program could be only a very limited one." Kelly, Comment on Harold M. Hyman's
Paper,in NEw FRONTIERS OF THE AMERICAN RECONSTRUCION 55 (H. Hyman ed. 1966).
105. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 82 (1872).
106. Id. at 78.
107. Leedes, supra note 24, at 557 (quoting 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 123).
108. Id. at 556.
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ment."' 10 9 And when it fell to him to write the opinion in the Civil
Rights Cases, Bradley stated that the 1866 Act sought to secure
those fundamental rights which are the essence of civil freedom, namely,
the same right to make and enforce contracts, to sue. . . to inherit, [and
to] purchase . . . property, as is enjoyed by white citizens. Congress did
not assume . . .to adjust what may be called the social rights of men
. . .but only to declare and vindicate those fundamental rights. ... 11O
In seeking to distill an "underlying reason" of the fourteenth
amendment, Leedes stresses that "segregation was actually a greater
evil than many of the practices that were specifically banned by the
Civil Rights Act of 1866.""' Agreed. But the Court is not authorized
to write in what the Framers clearly excluded. It is no answer to urge
that "[i]f Brown is 'extraconstitutional,' then MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co. is extralegal. Both were the culminations of lines of growth
in case law, and were incremental by-products of an acceptable and
traditional common law theory of adjudication." ' The analogy is
faulty; judges were allowed to shape the common law of contracts and
torts without written limits, and subject to Parliament's power to overrule such decisions."' But our Constitution places limits on all delegated powers and reserves the right to change the Constitution to the
people by amendment.1 1 Unlike the judges' power to change the common law until Parliament acts, the courts, Marshall himself wrote, are
not empowered "to change the instrument."11 5 Marshall could not well
109. Live-Stock Dealers' & Butchers' Ass'n v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing &
Slaughter-House Co., 15 F. Cas. 649, 655 (C.C.D. La. 1870) (No. 8,408).
110. 109 U.S. 3, 22 (1883) (emphasis added). James Wilson, chairman of the House Judiciary Committee and manager of the Civil Rights Bill, presented it "to the House as a measure of

limited and definite objectives. In this he followed the lead of the majority in the Senate ...
[aind the line he laid down was followed by others who spoke for the bill in the House." Bickel,
The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1, 17 (1955).
111. Leedes, supra note 24, at 557.
112. Id. at 558.
113. Chief Justice Mansfield, who freely revised common-law decisions, felt bound by statute. See infra note 280.
114. Tushnet remarks,
If judges deciding contract cases got out of line and imposed their values on an unwilling
populace, the legislature could always intervene to set things right. . . . [But] [ilf the
Justices

. .

.decided to write their personal values into law

. . .

there was nothing, at least

formally and in the short run, the rest of us could do about it.
Tushnet, supra note 13, at 811.

115. JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 209 (G. Gunther ed.
1969) [hereinafter cited as JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE]. See also R. BERGER, supra note 10, at
375-78. Even that flaming activist, Justice William Brennan, Jr., assured the Senate that " '[t]he
only way to amend the Constitution . . .is by the method provided in the Constitution.'" Levinson, supra note 35, at 572 (quoting Hearings on the Nomination of William Brennan, Jr. to be
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong.,
1st Sess. 40 (1957), reprinted in 6 R. MERSKY & J. JACOBSTEIN, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
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claim for the Court what he had denied Congress in McCulloch v. Maryland: "should Congress, under the pretext of executing its powers,
pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the government," they would be held "not the law of the land." 1 6
The "briefs" are in, and it is high time to "find" the facts. As
Saphire notes, "'historical evidence must be weighed as well as
cited,' ,,17 particularly because the Court's manifest revision of the
Framers' unmistakable exclusion of suffrage and segregation from the
fourteenth amendment is basic to evaluation of its role. There the problem appears in all its nakedness. Finding the facts with respect to suffrage and segregation is not, I submit, "a terribly complex business
fraught with serious and important methodological problems.""' The
historical facts speak out so plainly on these issues as to require no
"theory of interpretation.""' What "interpretation" is needed for the
many flat statements that the amendment does not provide for suffrage,
as is confirmed by section 2 of the amendment, and the subsequent
fifteenth. Judges and lawyers are accustomed to weighing evidence, and
fact-finding should set the historical facts at rest and remove theorizing
from the realm of speculation. A philosophy not rooted in the facts is
delusory.
Since it would be unreasonable to require Professors Lupu and
Saphire to test every one of the many facts I have collected, I invite
them to weigh the Dimond-Gibbons-Murphy-Soifer critiques and my
replies, which are geared to the debates. It should suffice to settle the
facts with respect to suffrage and segregation, but since my critics lavish their attention on lesser details, it may be useful to settle those too
so that we may proceed to the larger question of judicial authorization.
At this stage that task seems more profitable than further
philosophizing.
BEGINNING BEFORE THE BEGINNING

Most judges and lawyers would accept Philip Kurland's formula-

40 (1975)).
116. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 423 (1819). It is no mean achievement to find in McCulloch
the "idea of evolving constitutionalism." Lupu, supra note 3, at 603.
117. Saphire, supra note 11, at 770 n.106 (quoting Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2690,
2703 n.31 (1982)). "[H]istorical analysis may be perceived as rooted in preexisting, verifiable
facts which provide an objective premise-a 'shared standard of argument' from which the reasoning process can proceed." Id. at 767 (quoting Munzer & Nickel, Does the Constitution Mean
What It Always Meant?, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1029, 1059 (1977)).
118. Saphire, supra note 11, at 776.
119. See infra text accompanying notes 142-72. The Court has long been committed to the
age-old rule that "[tihe intention of the lawmaker is the law." Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197,
212 (1903) (quoting Smythe v. Fiske, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 374, 380 (1874)).
UNITED STATES
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tion of the postulates of our democratic system:
In theory, our government . . . derives . . . the source of its lawmaking function ... from the mandate of the people, expressed primarily in written constitutions. . . . [W]e generally accede to the proposition that we are all to be governed by the same preestablished rules and
not by the whim of those charged with executing those rules. . . . The
difference between rule by law and rule by fiat or discretion12 is largely
what distinguishes the democracies of the West from the governments of
most of the rest of the world....
. . . [F]rom the beginning [the Court] assumed the role . . . of
keeper of the rule of law as embodied in the Constitution.1 2

Lawlessness is the earmark of despotism, and its costs, exemplified by
Hitler and Stalin, should be enough to cause us to cling to the rule of
law.
Why, a symposiast asked, is "what the Framers did . . . authori-

tative?" 12 ' Arthur S. Miller maintains that the "Founding Fathers...
cannot rule us from their graves,"' " charging that constitutionalists invoke the shades of the Framers because "[i]f we pretend that the framers had a special sort of wisdom, then perhaps we do not have to think
hard about how to solve pressing social problems."" 4 The real issue,

120. Apparently "judicial whim, in its most subjective, unconstrained form" finds no favor
with Lupu. See Lupu, supra note 3, at 616. Saphire likewise concludes that judges "are simply
not free to give the Constitution any meaning which pleases their personal preferences and biases." Saphire, supra note 11, at 804 n.217. Tushnet also acknowledges that the interpretivist
view-"We are indeed better off being bound by the dead hand of the past than being subjected
to the whim of willful judges trying to make the Constitution live"-is "fairly powerful." Tushnet,
Following the Rules Laid Down. A Critique of lnterpretivism and Neutral Principles,96 HARV.
L. REV. 781, 787 (1983).

121. Kurland, supra note 2, at 582-83.
122. Alexander, supra note 81, at 454. David Richards calls for "a theory of popular sovereignty." Richards, supra note 53, at 727. Alexander likewise asks, "[Wiho are to be regarded as
'the Framers' and how [should we] go about aggregating their intentions?" Alexander, supra note
81, at 451. A lawyer would look at the roster of participants in the Convention, and he or she
would "aggregate their intentions" as Corwin did with respect to the very judicial review which
activists are so eager to expand: "True these are only seventeen names out of a possible fifty-five,
but let it be considered whose names they are. They designate fully three-fourths of the leaders of
the Convention . . . . They were the leaders of that body and its articulate members." E.
CORWIN, THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 10-13 (1914). Opposition was negligible-at best

two members disapproved in the Convention; two others disapproved outside its halls, not one of
them a leader. R. BERGER, supra note 53, at 112-13. The Court has steadily applied such criteria
in the realm of statutory construction. Justice Frankfurter stated, "It has never been questioned in
this Court that Committee reports, as well as statements by those in charge of a bill or of a report,
are authoritative elucidations of the scope of a measure." Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers
Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 399-400 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
123. Miller, Book Review, Washington Post, Nov. 13, 1977, § E (Book World), at 5, col. 1.
124. Miller, An Inquiry into the Relevance of the Intentions of the FoundingFathers, with
Special Emphasis upon the Doctrine of the Separation of Powers, 27 ARK. L. REv. 583, 596
(1973). Leedes also states, "Attributing responsibility for the decision to the 'wise men we call
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however, is whether the solution of those "pressing social problems"
was confided to the judiciary. Paul Brest meets this head on, challenging the assumption that judges are bound by the Constitution. 2 5 Robert Cover is equally candid, even thrusting aside "the Constitution's
self-evident meaning"; he explains that "we" have decided to "entrust"
judges with forming an "ideology" by which legislative action can be
measured, 12 and, it may be added, the Framers' choices supplanted.
Of course, he does not point to the source of this decision but equates
the wishes of academic illuminati with the will of "we, the people." In
one form or another, shrouded in philosophic jargon, the symposiasts
would turn our destiny over to judges. Dwelling on the need to accommodate to "change" they postulate that judges-unaccountable and irremovable-must make the changes.127 But, remarks Sanford Levinson, "[T]he operative code of judicial writing seems to require a
profession that judicial views are indeed linked, in just the way described by interpretivism, with the foundation document itself."' 12 Robert Bork commented that the Court "regularly insists that its results
. . .are supported, indeed compelled, by a proper understanding of the
Constitution . . . . Value choices are attributed to the Founding Fa2'9
thers, not to the Court."'
"Our Constitution," Larry Alexander observes, "and the preconstitutional rules that give it meaning are authoritative only because we
have decided for the moment that they shall be.' 3 0 Its roots go deeper.
Paul Brest acknowledged that "the written Constitution lies at the core

"the framers"' gives comfort to the public and a sense of repose to the profession." Leedes, supra
note 24, at 542 (quoting Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1033, 1038
(1981)). What price the constitutional curbs on delegated powers? See infra text accompanying
note 135. "[T]he development of our values over the course of nearly two centuries has been in the
direction of strengthening belief in the wisdom of the framers' intentions." Sandalow, supra, at
1062.
125. Brest, supra note 25, at 224.
126. Cover, Book Review, NEW REPUBLIc, Jan. 14, 1978, at 26, 27.
127. Justice Black dismissed "rhapsodical strains, about the duty of the Court to keep the
Constitution in tune with the times. . . .The Constitution makers knew the need for change and
provided for it" by the amendment process of article V. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
522 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Marshall was of the same mind. He flatly stated
that the judicial power "cannot be the assertion of a right to change" the Constitution. JOHN
MARSHALL'S DEFENSE, supra note 115, at 209. He stated in Marbury v. Madison that "[t]he
constitution is either a superior, paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is . . .
alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it." 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (emphasis added). Having denied Congress the power to expand the Court's original jurisdiction, he could
hardly claim greater powers of alteration for the Court, and in fact proceeded to deny such claims.
128. Levinson, supra note 35, at 571.
129. Bork, supra note 26, at 3-4.
130. Alexander, supra note 81, at 463. I would agree that such decisions "are always up for
reconsideration," but by the people, not by the judges. Id. Article V reserves the power of amendment to the people.
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of the American 'civil religion.' Not only judges and other public officials, but the citizenry at large habitually invoke the Constitution
.... ,1381
It is respected, Leedes remarks, as "the basic norm by the

Supreme Court,"'

2

which, said Hamilton, "is, in fact, and must be

regarded by the judges as, a fundamental law." 13 3 Henry Monaghan

considers that the "authoritative status of the written Constitution...
is an incontestable first principle for theorizing about American Constitutional Law.913 4 From the standpoint of the public, "[tihe problem
with judge-made law is . . . the fear . . . of unfettered discretion,
which enables courts to impose unacceptable values on people.' 8185

In short, "the legal supremacy of the Constitution," Corwin stated,
"is due to its being the ordinance of the sovereign will of the people."'3 6

The Framers submitted the Constitution to "the people" for ratification
in order that the Constitution, in Madison's words, would be "established by the people themselves."' 7 Ely notes that "once the Constitution was ratified . . . virtually everyone in America accepted it immediately as the document controlling his destiny," as the authentic voice
of the people." 8 That the people continue so to regard it1 39 is evidenced

131. Brest, supra note 25, at 234 (quoting Levinson, "The Constitution" in American Civil
Religion, 1979 SuP. CT. REv. 123)).
132. Leedes, supra note 24, at 539.
133. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 506 (A. Hamilton) (Mod. Libr. ed. 1937).
134. Monaghan, supra note 7, at 383. Courts, like legislatures, are the creature of the Constitution and cannot "break through the fundamental rules of the Constitution without destroying
their own foundation." Letter of the Massachusetts House to the Marquis of Rockingham Jan.
22. 1768, in DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 65 (H. Commager ed. 1963). Lupu considers
that "the text generally remains as a boundary beyond which value selection cannot responsibly
proceed." Lupu, supra note 3, at 606.
Brest, however, asserts that "the practice of supplementing and derogating from the text...
is itself part of our constitutional tradition." Brest, supra note 25, at 225. Judicial tradition cannot
legitimate violation of the Constitution. In Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), the
Court, per Justice Brandeis, quoting Justice Holmes, branded the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson "'an
unconstitutional assumption of powers by courts of the United States which no lapse of time or
respectable array of opinion should make us hesitate to correct.'" Id. at 79 (quoting B. & W.
Taxi Co. v. B. & Y. Taxi Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). "[T]here can
be no doubt that an unconstitutional practice, no matter how inveterate, cannot be condoned by
the judiciary." Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 616 (D.C. Cir. 1975). "[N]o one acquires a
vested or protected right in violation of the Constitution by long use .
Walz v. Tax Comm'n,
397 U.S. 664, 678 (1970).
135. Leedes, supra note 24, at 563, 540.
136. E. CORWIN, THE TWILIGHT OF THE SUPREME COURT 106-07 (1934).
137. 2 M. FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 93
(1911). These materials explain why "the Framers, but not the Supreme Court, have authority to
bind us to value judgments not endorsed by contemporary popular bodies." Alexander, supra note
81, at 454 n.29. No such power was delegated to the courts, whereas the sovereign people ratified
the labors of the Framers.
138. Ely, Constitutional Interpretivism: Its Allure and Impossibility, 53 IND. L.J. 399, 409
(1978). Saphire remarks that the Constitution "reflected and embodied at least a general consensus of seminal political values and attracted widespread endorsement and consent." Saphire, supra
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by their repeated choice to amend, not repeal, it. Academic repudiation
of the binding effect of the Constitution has yet to win similar endorsement. Those who argue that the Founders could not "bind subsequent
*generations" would draw back from submitting the issue to the people;
they seek rather to have the judges make changes to which the people
would not consent. "1 0 And activists are the first to appeal to the "Constitution" in defense of judicial creation of extraconstitutional
"rights,"' 1 for they dare not avow that the courts may take that determination away from the people.
A

THEORY OF INTERPRETATION

Juridical progress, Alexander intimates, must wait on a "satisfactory theory of interpretation."'4 2 The many conflicting activist theories
of judicial review suggest, however, that a "satisfactory theory" will be
long aborning. 4 3 For centuries judges have construed documents in its
absence. A novel theory is likely to complicate rather than explain a
familiar, understandable practice.14 4 Consider a sensible explanation of
the respect due to a contemporaneous construction by Chief Justice
Prisot in 1454: "[T]he judges who gave these decisions in ancient times
were nearer to the making of the statute than we now are, and had
more acquaintance with it,' ' 4 5 that is, with the purposes the draftsmen
note 11, at 790. These materials meet Alexander's view that "[a] sound theory of interpretation
would tell us . . . why what they [the Framers] did is authoritative .
Alexander, supra note
81, at 453-54.
Activists have only their own aspirations which have not been endorsed by the people but
frequently are contrary to their will. Activist theories, Leedes observes, "are far more transitory
than the Constitution they describe." Leedes, supra note 24, at 534.
139. The "Constitution is widely accepted as this nation's basic source of valid law .
Leedes, supra note 24, at 533.
140. "Those who favor abortion, busing ... and oppose capital punishment, call themselves
and are generally regarded as liberals. But they obviously have no faith whatever in the wisdom or
the will of the great majority of the people who are opposed to them. They are doing everything
possible to have these problems resolved by" the courts. Bishop, What is a Liberal-Who is a
Conservative, COMMENTARY, Sept. 1976, at 47. Martin Shapiro wrote, "It would be fantastic
indeed if the Supreme Court . . . were to disavow publicly the myth on which its power rests
....
If the myth. . . is destroyed. . . the Court loses power." M. SHAPIRO, LAW AND POLITICS
IN THE SUPREME COURT 27 (1964).
141. Paul Brest admits that "[m]any of what we have come to regard as the irreducible
minima of rights are actually supra-constitutional; almost none of the others are entailed by the
text or original understanding." Brest, supra note 25, at 236.
142. Alexander, supra note 53, at 451.
143. The theories of constitutional law "generate serious differences of opinion." Leedes,
supra note 24, at 535. The premises "vary so widely that the achievement of consensus is likely to
be impossible." Maltz, Murder in the Cathedral-The Supreme Court as Moral Prophet, 8 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 623, 623 (1983). See also supra note 2.
144. Cf supra text accompanying note 5.
145. Windham v. Felbridge, Y.B. 33 Hen 4, f. 38, 41, pl. 17, quoted in C. ALLEN, LAW IN
THE MAKING

193 (6th ed. 1958).
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had in mind. Early in our history the Court adopted the rule, 146 and it
remains an established canon. The absence of a theory to explain a
rational practice of 630 years does not undermine the canon.
The evidence the the Framers, without contradiction, consideredthat segregation was excluded from the fourteenth amendment offers a
vantage point from which to examine Alexander's refined and subtle
analysis. Mine is not a case in which we "pay no heed to the identity
and circumstances of its author."' 41 The "author" was the members of
the thirty-ninth Congress, engaged in preventing a return of the emancipated slaves to serfdom in an atmosphere heavy with racism, content
to secure their right to contract and to own property. Next he reduces
my summary of the recorded evidence to a hypothetical question:
"[H]ad the Framers been asked at the time they were enacting the
fourteenth amendment, 'Does your amendment . . . outlaw racial segregation of schools?,' they would have answered, 'No.' "148 This transforms an actuality into a hypothetical; for the Framers did make plain
that segregation was left untouched. Hence Alexander's next caveat-it
is "possible for the author . . . to be mistaken in his hypothetical answer to the hypothetical question"' 9 -is beside the point. There was no
"mistake," for example, in the assurance by Chairman Wilson that the
Civil Rights Bill did not require mixed schools. Next Alexander asks,
suppose the Framers said "that equal protection does not cover racially
segregated schools because racially segregated schools can be equal,"
whereas we believe they "cannot, as a matter of fact, be equal. Do we
not properly 'interpret' equal protection when we apply it as we believe
the Framers would have wanted had they had the same factual beliefs
that we have, and not the mistaken factual beliefs they did have?"' 50
This substitutes fancy for fact. There is no evidence that the Framers
excluded mixed schools because they believed segregated schools "can
be equal." From 1861 to 1875 the evidence is that the Framers found
mixed schools repellent.' 8 ' "Mistaken" or not, it is the Framers' belief
that is controlling.' 52 Suppose, Alexander continues, we believe that the

146. Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 309 (1803); Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12
Wheat.) 213, 290 (1827).
147. Alexander, supra note 53, at 5.
148. Id. at 6.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Berger, supra note 21, at 326, 329. Paul Gewirz criticized the jurisprudence of hypotheticals. Gewirz, The Jurisprudence of Hypotheticals, 32 LEGAL EDUC. 120 (1982).
152. "It matters not," Charles Evans Hughes wrote, "whether [the Founders] were accurate in their understanding of the Great Charter . . . for the point is what the colonists thought it
meant" in framing their own constitutional provisions. C. HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES 186 (1928).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol9/iss2/2
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Framers' conception of justice is inferior to that of John Rawls, and
that had the Framers read Rawls, they "would have given the fourteenth amendment a distinctly Rawlsian flavor." 153 Is it proper now to
"interpret" the amendment in that spirit? Alexander candidly recognizes that "it is clear that the Framers would not have endorsed the
views of [Rawls]"; 54 so the issue simply is whether "we" may substitute our beliefs for the Framers' determination.
"At what level of generality of purpose," asks Alexander, "do we
interpret what the Framers . . . have done?" 155 For instance,
the practice of denying blacks the legal right to contract could be described at one level of generality as 'racial discrimination' and at higher
levels of generality as 'discrimination based on morally irrelevant characteristics,' 'unjust discrimination,' and 'injustice.' Because in drafting the
Constitution the Framers must have intended to promote 'wise and just
policy'1 56 . . . the Framers, in seeking to ban the practice of denying
blacks the legal right to contract, could be said to have banned the more
abstractly described practices as well.'"7
Raising the level of generality thus serves to replace the Framers' unmistakable refusal to go beyond banning discrimination with respect to
"contracts" with our own more generous views. For the Framers did
ban the latter; they declined to do so with regard to segregation, evidence that their "wise and just policy" was limited. Again and again
they refused to bar ALL discrimination. 5 8 What Alexander is saying,
to borrow from Justice Richard Neely, is that "if the Founding Fathers
had grown up in the twentieth century, had had all of our experiences,
and perceived the problems from our vantage point, they would decide
the case the way" we would decide it. "That is an interesting, but
hardly reassuring, approach to applying themandates of a written con-

153.

Alexander, supra note 53, at 7.

154. Id. at 7 n.17.
155. Id. at 7.
156. If they did not intend "to promote 'wise and just policy' ..
why attribute any authority to their intentions? . . ." Alexander, supra note 81, at 452. Because the Framers were the

delegates of the people who were no less opposed to suffrage than the Framers and went on to
ratify the amendment.
157. Id. (footnote omitted). Lupu clothes the Alexander argument in different rhetoric:
Brown "furthered a nineteenth century enactment's goal of equal citizenship without regard to
race, by recognizing the necessity of public education to full opportunity and full realization of
equal citizenship." Lupu, supra note 3, at 604. He ignores that the Framers left control of segregated schools to the States, substituting his goals for theirs.
Jacques Barzun observes that "abstractions form a ladder which takes the climber into the
clouds, where diagnostic differences disappear," adding that "at a high enough rung on the ladder
of abstraction, disparate things become the same: a song and spinning top are, after all, but two
ways of setting air waves in motion ...

"

J.

BARZUN,

158.byR.
BEROER, supra note 10, at 163-65.
Published
eCommons,
1983

supra note 5, at 59, 65 n.*.

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 9:2

stitutional document." '
Alexander demonstrates that by lifting the scale of generality one
can arrive at any result one pleases, as Saphire also exemplifies: Suppose a judge understood "the interpretive rules . . . to preclude a candid and explicit rejection of [the historical context]. [She] will attempt
to justify her decision by generalizing the historical context, or recasting it at a higher level of abstraction." 160 Tushnet cogently asks, "Why
describe the concept of equality on a level of generality so high that it
obliterates the specific intention to permit segregation?"1 61 The answer
is that only such devices enable activists to defend judicial usurpation.
In justice to Alexander, he perceives the flaw of resorting to the highest
level of generality, but he shrinks from choosing "a very low level of
generality at which to express the Framers' purposes, one that is about
as specific as the words' denotations for the Framers, [because] .we may
have to give effect to some very silly and obvious mistakes."' 6 2 What is
"mistaken" from our view in the case of segregation was a considered
judgment by the Framers. Exclusion of segregation was by our lights
worse than a mistake, it was an affront to decency, but it is one we may
correct by an amendment, not under the guise of judicial "interpretation." Bearing in mind that what is involved is judicial authority to
declare the 1866 "mistakes" unconstitutional, it needs to be
remembered that the 1787 Framers plainly distinguished "unreasonable" and "unjust" measures from those that were unconstitutional, a
distinction activists would erase. 1 36
Another example of virtuoso, high-level abstraction is furnished by
Richard Saphire's treatment of the provision that a Senator must be
thirty years of age. "[A]t some future time the senatorial age requirement might . . . plausibly be deemed ambiguous [?] . . . [or] interpreted in a nonliteral sense," viewing it as a "symbolic reference to
maturity." The Court would not be "overstepping its legitimate function . . . to hold that a twenty-nine-year-old is eligible for election to

159. R. NEELY, How COURTS GOVERN AMERICA 11 (1981). "One must be on his guard
against recreating history by hindsight and attributing to the language of an early legal doctrine
the implications which the evolution of experience has put into it." F. FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY AND WAITE 60 (1937).
160. Saphire, supra note 11, at 804 (footnote omitted). But Sandalow considers that constitutional provisions "cannot be employed to justify any result toward which we might be inclined at
a particular moment." Sandalow, supra note 124, at 1054.
161. Tushnet, supra note 120, at 791.
162. Alexander, supra note 53, at 7. Such thinking prompts Barzun to remark, "Why...
philosophers should have vied with each other in scorn of the knowledge of the particular and in
adoration of that of the general, is hard to understand .
i..."
J. BARZUN, supra note 5, at 58.
163. R. BERGER, supra note 10, at 301. "The courts are without authority to declare such
policy . . . . With the wisdom of the policy adopted . . . the courts are both incompetent and
unauthorized to deal." Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol9/iss2/2
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the Senate."16 That is the end of the activist trail: judicial revision of
the constitutional text-judges, as Brest maintains, are not bound by
the Constitution.
A last example: David Richards pays tribute to "the Herculean
excavation of background rights,""' and cites "Brandeis' excavation of
the right to privacy, as underlying various extant rights of property,
tort, copyright, and unfair competition, thus resonating to an independent right of tort and, eventually, constitutional law." '66 This is not
"excavation" in the Constitution or its history, but a construct out of
thin air. "Privacy as an all-encompassing constitutional right was...
not a part of the legal tradition inherited from England by the colonies
... ,16 Philip Kurland correctly stated that "phrases [like 'the right

of privacy'] are no part of the Constitution." It evidences "deconstruction by label."' 68
Are "canons" of interpretation "merely rules of thumb for interpretation" or " 'legal' rules," "evidentiary presumption[s]," or "some
sort of meta-constitutional norm" similar to the parol evidence rule,
Alexander asks. 6 Untroubled by such refinements Hamilton explained, "To avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they should be bound down by strict rules and precedents
which serve to define and point out their duty in every particular
case." 170 The reason was made clear by Justice Story, asking how a
federal statute is "to be interpreted." "Are the rules of the common
law to furnish the proper guide, or is every court and department to
give it any interpretation it may please, according to its own arbitrary
will?" 7 1 Rules of construction, he declared, provide a "fixed standard"
for interpretation of the Constitution, 7 without which a "fixed" Constitution would be altogether unfixed. The Founders preferred rules,
however imperfect, to leaving courts, in the words of James Kent, "to a
dangerous discretion to roam at large in the trackless field of their own
imaginations,"173 let alone the vaulting imaginations of academics.
Finally, it is a mistake, Alexander remarks, to consider interpreta-

164. Saphire, supra note 11, at 795.
165. Richards, supra note 53, at 742.
166. Id. at 737 n.58.
167. Caplan, The History and Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 69 VA. L. REV. 223, 267
(1983) (footnote omitted).
168. Kurland, supra note 2, at 592.
169. Alexander, supra note 53, at 8.
170. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 510 (A. Hamilton) (Mod. Libr. ed. 1937).
171. 1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 158 n.2
(5th ed. 1905).
172. Id. § 399.
ON AMERICAN LAW 373 (9th ed. 1958).
173.
J. KENT, COMMENTARIES
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tion "as a constant in whatever situation it figures," that is, "from a
court's interpretation of a constitutional provision to a court's interpretation of a statute to a trustee's interpretation of a trust document, and
so on. .... ,,174 Unimpeded by such categorization, Chief Justice Marshall treated the written constitution "just as other legal documents
are," 17 5 following the common-law practice summarized by Thomas
Rutherforth in 1756. Rutherforth assimilated the interpretation of statutes to that of contracts and wills, and stated that "[tihe end, which
interpreters aim at, is to find out what was the intention of the writer,
to clear up the meaning of his words. 1 7 6 Why should we be willing to
effectuate the intention of a testator and refuse to give effect to the
unmistakable intention of the Framers? When they voted 128 to 12 in
the House and 34 to 4 in the Senate to readmit Tennessee notwithstanding it barred Negro suffrage, 17 why is that intention to be
thwarted? In a national scale of values, effectuation of the Framers'
intention is vastly more important than that of a testator. Activists
have too hastily interred the "original intention" doctrine, for in 1983
the Supreme Court rested two important decisions-the legislative veto
and legislative-chaplain-prayer cases--on the intention of the Framers.
THE ORIGINAL INTENTION

In his contribution to the symposium, Richard Saphire examines
the "original intention" problem in detail, picking up the views of
others, and it may serve to illustrate the difficulties and contradictions
that enmesh noninterpretive analysis. Echoing Ronald Dworkin, he asserts that "there is nd such thing as a concrete and knowable intent of
the framers. 178 Nonetheless, the Court in its 1983 legislative veto and
legislative chaplain cases relied heavily on the Framers' intent. Dworkin's categorical assertion is contradicted by the Framers' unmistakable

intention to exclude suffrage from the fourteenth amendment. Saphire
recognizes that "[tfhe strongest case for . . . treating the historical
context as dispositive-would be based upon an historical record which
is completely accessible and unambiguous, "179 as is exactly exemplified

by the exclusion of suffrage and segregation from the fourteenth
amendment. And he cites Jesse Choper for the axiom that a "'reasoned constitutional thesis . . . must fail if it is contradicted by the

174. Alexander, supra note 53, at 8.
175. Tushnet, supra note 120, at 787.
176. T. RUTHERFORT, INSTITUTES OF NATURAL
177. R. BERGER, supra note 10, at 79, 59-60.
178. Saphire, supra note I1, at 772, 778.
179. Id. at 781.
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clear intention of the framers.' 80
Saphire recognizes that "'[e]ffectuation of the draftsman's intention is a long-standing rule of interpretation in the construction of all
documents-wills, contracts, statutes .

*...'

"181 In truth, the rule is

centuries old, as the Court pointed out in Hawaii v. Mankichi, calling
attention to the medieval bloodletting case in Bologna, and stating,
"'The intention of the lawmaker is the law. .

.

. [A] thing which is

within the letter of the statute, is not within the statute, unless it be
within the intention of the makers.' "182 On the heels of the Convention, Justice James Wilson, a leading participant, said, "The first and
governing maxim in the interpretation of a statute is, to discover the
meaning of those, who made it."' 83 Justice Story reiterated that "(tihe
first and fundamental rule in the interpretation of all instruments is to
construe them according to . . . the intention of the parties. '"'8 "

180. Id. at 786 n.160 (quoting J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 241 (1980)).
181. Id. at 764 (quoting R. BERGER, supra note 10, at 365).
182. 190 U.S. 197, 212 (1903) (quoting Smythe v. Fiske, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 374, 380
(1874)). See also United States v. Freeman, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 555, 565 (1845). Jacobus tenBroek
stated that the Court "has insisted, with almost uninterrupted regularity, that the end and object
of constitutional construction is the discovery of the intention of those persons who formulated the
instrument." tenBroek, Use by the Supreme Court of Extrinsic Aids in Constitutional Construction: The Intent Theory of Constitutional Construction, 27 CALIF. L. REV. 399, 399 (1939).

183.

1 THE WORKS

OF JAMES WILSON

75 (R. McCloskey ed. 1967). In reading McCulloch

v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), to militate against an "original intention" approach
because the Constitution was not to be a "detailed code of particulars" but rather was to facilitate
"growth and flexibility," Lupu overlooks Marshall's own explanation of its holding. Lupu, supra
note 3, at 602, 603 n.123. The issue was whether Congress was empowered to establish the Bank
of the United States, and that turned on whether a bank was a proper means for execution of
other expressly granted powers. The Court said, "To have prescribed the means by which government should, in all future time, execute its powers, would have been [to give the Constitution] the
properties of a legal code." 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 415 (emphasis added). In John Marshall's
Defense of McCulloch v. Maryland, Marshall stressed again and again that the case "does not
contain the most distant allusion to any extension by constructionof the power of Congress. Its
sole object is to remind us that a constitution cannot possibly enumerate the means by which the
powers of government are to be carried into execution." JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE, supra note
115, at 185 (emphasis added).
It is not a little remarkable that scholars like Sandalow continue to quote Marshall's sonorous
dictum--" 'a Constitution ... intended to endure for ages . . . and, consequently, to be adapted
to the various crises of human affairs'" without noticing the vigorous disclaimer unearthed by
Gerald Gunther in 1969. See Sandalow, supra note 124, at 1033 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819)).
Lupu misreads Marshall when he asserts "the rigidities of a narrow 'historical practice only'
limitation would be deeply threatening to the McCulloch idea of evolving constitutionalism."
Lupu, supra note 3, at 603. Not only does this conflict with Marshall's disclaimer of a right "to
change the instrument," JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE, supra note 115, at 209, but with his statement in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), that if a word was understood in a
certain sense "when the Constitution was framed" then "[t]he convention must have used the
word in that sense"-and it is that sense which is to be given judicial effect. Id. at 190.
184. 1 J. STORY, supra note 171, § 400. Toward the close of his life, Madison wrote that
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Saphire agrees "emphatically that consideration of the historical context is an inherent aspect of constitutional reasoning," flowing "not
only from considerations of judicial legitimacy, but from the very nature of constitutionalism itself."18 5 He recognizes "how deeply entrenched historical justification has become as an essential element in
acceptable constitutional discourse," ' 86 that "[h]istorical analysis has
always been understood by judges as a key ingredient of legal reasoning," and that "historical grounding is an important element of judicial
legitimacy. ' 187 Levinson observes that judges "continue, however
naively and unconvincingly, to claim that their decisions indeed follow
from honest construction of the text."' 88 As Robert Bork remarked,
"[Vialue choices are attributed to the Founding Fathers, not to the
Court," commenting, "The way an institution advertises tells you what
it thinks its customers demand."' 89 The Court knows full well that its
power rests on the people's belief that it is administering mandates of
the Constitution,'9 0 not cramming its own predilections down the throat
of a resisting public.
Opposition to the "intention" rule is a very recent phenomenon,
representing an effort to escape the grip of the Framers' intention to
leave segregation to the States, for that cuts the ground from under
Brown v. Board of Education. As said by Henry Monaghan, many of
those opposed to the limitations of a Framers' intent restriction view
those restrictions as an impediment to their political goals. 9 1 And he
insists "that any theory of constitutional interpretation which renders
unimportant or irrelevant questions as to the original intent, so far as
that intent can be fairly discerned, is not, given our tradition, politically or intellectually defensible."1'92 As Leedes observes, "Indeed, if a
judge's understanding of the Constitution is ascribed to the framers in
the Court's opinion, he is following a traditional practice that has not

the "sense of the Constitution" can "alone" be found "in the proceedings of the Convention, the
contemporary expositions, and above all in the ratifying conventions of the States. If the instrument be interpreted by criticisms which lose sight of the intention of the parties to it . . . the
purest motives can be no security against innovation materially changing the features of government." 3 M. FARRAND, supra note 137, at 474.
185. Saphire, supra note 11, at 786 n.153 (citation omitted). Henry Monaghan observes
that "original intent" is "a way of thinking about constitutional 'meaning' that follows from the
basic concepts that legitimate judicial review itself." Monaghan, supra note 7, at 375.
186. Saphire, supra note 11, at 787.
187. Id. at 802. Saphire "believe[s] the historical context is an inherent aspect of constitutional reasoning. . . . [It) plays an important role." Id. at 784 n.145.
188. Levinson, supra note 35, at 574 n.30.
189. Bork, supra note 26, at 4.
190. M. SHAPIRO, supra note 140.
191. Monaghan, supra note 7.
192. Monaghan, supra note 41, at 124.
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been abandoned, except by a minute fraction of the population who
write critically about the Court's reliance on the framers' intent."""3 A
tradition so deeply rooted in the past calls to mind Tushnet's "historiographical principle that it is reasonable to require more evidence to
show a radical discontinuity than to show a steady continuity in
history."'19
Saphire, however, is assailed by doubts; because of the "imperfection of historical analysis, the .

.

. intent theory begin[s] to un-

198

"Even if we assume that all or most persons living during the
ravel."
period of constitutional formulation shared the values originally embodied in the Constitution and that they agreed to abide by its terms, this
assumption loses force as time progresses."' " It is true that a large
proportion of the population, represented by the anti-federalists, strenuously opposed adoption, but as Ely notes, once adopted, it was "immediately" accepted by everyone "as the document controlling his
destiny." 19 If our generation no longer shares the original values-a
matter to be established by proof not speculation-it is open to the
people to embody that change in the Constitution. It was not given the
Court, as Justice Black stressed, to keep the Constitution in tune with
the times, 1 "8 no matter how our own world is "profoundly different
from the world of our predecessors." 1 " No activist has adequately explained where the judiciary was empowered to make such alterations.
"[R]igid adherence by courts to that intent," Saphire urges, "can...
adversely affect contemporary impressions with respect to the legitimacy of the exercise of judicial power." For example, if "the original
understanding . . . no longer commands widespread endorsement, a

court which rigidly adheres to it may be perceived as imposing anti-

Leedes, supra note 24, at 544-45; see also Saphire, supra note 11, at 793 n. 176 (quot63 (E. Cahn ed. 1954) (comments of J.P. Frank)).
194. Tushnet, supra note 120, at 794.
195. Saphire, supra note 11, at 782. If the intent theory "unravels," then Saphire's suggestion to treat it "as a relevant, although not necessarily dispositive, element of constitutional intepretation" is incongruous. Id. at 750. Why encumber analysis with an unravelled theory?
Saphire himself asks, "[Hlow and when is the Court to consider the original understanding in
reaching its decision?" Id. at 783 n.144. Indeed, he concludes, "Without the blinders imposed by
rigid historical analysis, judges will be free to interpret the Constitution by resorting to such inherently subjective criteria as natural law or visions of enlightened progress," id. at 802, with
intent theory serving as window dressing "for justifying a court's decisions." Id. at 802 n.209.
196. Id. at 767.
197. See Ely, supra note 138, at 409.
198. See supra note 127.
199. Saphire, supra note 11, at 768. If "the Supreme Court's purpose is to establish justice
without reference to the original intent of the framers, then what remains to circumscribe judicial
power? Berger's critics have singularly unsatisfactory answers to this question." Kommers, supra
193.
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quated and irrelevant solutions for modern-day problems."' 0 This is
splendid irony viewed against the Court's overturn of death penalties in
1972, notwithstanding the "original understanding" of "cruel and unusual punishments" still "commands widespread endorsement"; its imposition of immediate support of indigent migrants at the terminus of
their travel, 0 1 etc. etc. These examples offend "stability," because as
Saphire points out, "change and growth occur incrementally and not
radically."2 02 To be sure, Saphire reads "cruel and unusual punishment" as "hopelessly vague or open-ended," 20 3 but the undeniable historical fact is that from 1689 to 1972 it was never applied to death
penalties.2 0
Saphire also opines that the Framers' understanding may "be so
inconsistent with our society's contemporary views as to make the ap2 0 5 That
plication of the framers' conceptions seem unjust."1
cannot be
said of the death penalty and school prayer decisions, nor about the
abortion decision which still splits the nation.'" And activists concede
that the nation was not-ready to accept desegregation in 1954.201 Be it
assumed that the Court was truly effectuating contemporary opinion,
the original understanding can no more be discarded than the text. Of
the cognate common-law meaning of a term, Justice Story stated, the
common-law definitions "are necessarily included, as much as if they
stood in the text of the [Constitution] ."208 The same holds true of the
Framers' intention as Bacon's Abridgment makes clear: "A thing which
is within the intention of the makers of a statute, is as much within the

200. Saphire, supra note il, at 768. This seems incompatible with Saphire's statement that

as a member of the "'interpretive community'" the "judge will be expected to operate within the
framework of certain 'disciplining rules' or shared standards of interpretation which will constrain
legal analysis whether or not the judge personally accepts them. In constitutional law, one such
rule requires that constitutional decisions be connected (or at least connectable) to principles or
values which have historical roots." Id. at 804 (footnotes omitted).
201. See- Berger, Residence Requirements for Welfare and Voting: A Post-Mortem, 42
OFHo ST. L.J. 853 (1981).
202. Saphire, supra note 11, at 769.
203. Id. at 770.
204. R. BERGER, supra note 86. Sanford Levinson wrote, "Any textualist comes up with a
devastating problem in regard to the death penalty: both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
specifically acknowledge the possibility of a death penalty. . . . Btrger easily shows that the various framers did not regard infliction of death as cruel or unusual." Levinson, supra note 43, at
248, 249.
205. Saphire, supra note 11, at 771.
206. The "'people' do not appear to embrace the decisions made in their name." Levinson,
supra note 35, at 569. See also R. BERGER, supra note 10, at 325-27.
207. Brest wrote, "Imagine, if you will, the fate of an amendment proposed in the mid-50's
. . . to require school desegregation." Brest, supra note 25, at 237. Edmund Cahn stated that "as
a practical matter it would have been impossible to secure adoption of a constitutional amendment
to abolish 'separate but equal.'" Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 150, 156 (1955).
208. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160 (1820).
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statute as if it were within the letter.

' 20 9

Moreover, the Court has a

sorry record as a diviner of "society's contemporary views.2

Were

the record more glowing the Court may not substitute for amendment
under article V alteration by the judiciary, as Hamilton categorically
stated: "Until the people have by some solemn and authoritative act
annulled or changed the established form, it is binding upon themselves
collectively, as well as individually; and no presumption, or even knowl-

edge of their sentiments, can warrant their representatives in a departure from it, prior to such an act."211
It remains to consider another group of Saphire's objections:
whose intentions count--drafters or ratifiers? 1 2 Confining ourselves to
the 1866 treatment of suffrage, we may safely conclude that Framers

and ratifiers were of one mind. The Report of the Joint Committee on
Reconstruction, which concluded that suffrage had best be left to the
States, was "distributed by the thousands" and served the Republican
campaign for ratification. 1 " It was, Senator Jacob Howard stated in
May 1870, "accepted . . . by the Republican party universally and

without dissent, [and] presented to the people as leaving control of suffrage in State hands. 2 1 4 The "off-year elections," during which ratification was debated, Morton Keller noted, "made clear the popular hostility to black suffrage in the North,"' 1 "[m]ost congressmen

. . .

did

not intend to risk drowning by swimming against the treacherous current of racial prejudice against Negro suffrage" ;216 "[b]esides, public

opinion strongly opposed Negro rights, and the state legislatures who

209.

M.

BACON, A NEW ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND "Statute"

(5) (3d ed.

1768).
210. Justice, then Solicitor General, Robert H. Jackson, wrote, "time has proved that [the
Court's] judgment was wrong on most of the outstanding issues upon which it has chosen to

challenge the popular branches." R.

JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY X,

36-38 (1941). See also R. BERGER, supra note 10, at 331 n.66.
211. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 509 (A. Hamilton) (Mod. Libr. ed. 1937). This answers
Alexander's question, "Why should political practices which were banned by the Framers continue to be banned by the Supreme Court in the face of popular approval reflected in Congress
." Alexander, supra note 81, at 453.
"[T]he legitimacy of governmental power ultimately rests on the consent of the governed."
Lupu, supra note 3, at 589; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 141 (A. Hamilton) (Mod. Libr.
ed. 1937). Justice James Iredell, a stout proponent of judicial review, stated, "The people have
chosen to be governed under such and such principles. They have not chosen to be governed or
promised to submit upon any other." 2 G. McREE, LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES IREDELL 146 (1857-1858).
212. Saphire, supra note 11, at 773.
213. See A. AviNS, supra note 19, at vi.
214. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3614 (1870), reprinted in A. AvINS, supra note
19, at 448.
215. M. KELLER, AFFAIRS OF STATE 81 (1977).
216. W. GILLETTE, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: POLITICS AND THE PASSAGE OF THE FIFTEENTH
AMENDMENT 25 (2d ed. 1969).
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outraged this consensus would commit political suicide. 2 17 The rational inference is that the ratifiers endorsed the Framers' exclusion of
suffrage, as a search of the ratification records by Charles Fairman and
Justice Harlan confirmed.2 1 8
Saphire is also perplexed by the question "[M]ust we discount
[the] authoritativeness [of The Federalist Papers] in light of their
propagandist nature?"2 1 9 Undoubtedly, they were designed to swing
votes, but representations made to quiet fears of the electorate may not
now be repudiated as mere propaganda. Jefferson, one of Hamilton's
fiercest opponents, wrote that The Federalist is received "as evidence
of the general opinion of those who framed, and of those who accepted
the Constitution . . . on questions as to its genuine meaning."220 It was
warmly praised by Washington who was the presiding officer of the
Convention and by Marshall.2 21 What Clinton Rossiter considered
"stands third only to the Declaration of Independence, and the Constitution itself among the sacred writings of American political history,"2 22 Saphire and Walter Murphy would dismiss as mere propaganda-a desperate cause.
Next Saphire asks, "Do we focus on the purely subjective, psychological state of the individual, or should we concentrate on objective
indicia of intent? 2 2 8 If this puzzles philosophers, the answer for lawyers is plain. The general principle, in the words of Justice Holmes, is
that if a man made a statement designed to influence the actions of
others, he is liable "whatever was the [undisclosed] state of his
mind. 2 2 4 Speakers in the debates sought to influence the votes of
others, and they cannot be heard to say that they had undisclosed reservations; still less may academicians make that claim on their behalf.
Of a similar claim by William Crosskey, Henry Hart scornfully commented on the "ineffability of [Crosskey's] assumption that in the interpretation of a doctrine embodying a grant of fundamental powers
from the people . . . the representations made to the people to obtain
the grant are irrelevant, and what alone counts are the secret thoughts

217. Id. at 80.
218. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 196-97 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Fairman,
Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5, 81 (1949).
219. Saphire, supra note 11, at 774. Walter Murphy anticipated Saphire in dismissing The
Federalist as "brilliant polemics." Murphy, supra note 53, at 1765.
220. C. ROSSITER, ALEXANDER HAMILTON AND THE CONSTITUTION 52, 227 (1964) (quoting
THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON 1112 (S.K. Padover ed. 1943)).
221. See Brown, Book Review, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1439, 1445-46 (1954).
222. C. ROSSITER, supra note 220, at 52.
223. Saphire, supra note 11, at 774.
224. O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 136 (1923).
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of men who drew the document the people approved.""' Story put the
matter more forcibly: "If the Constitution was ratified under the belief
sedulously propagated,that such protection was offered, would it not
now be a fraud upon the whole people to give a different
26
construction.'
Why, Saphire asks, if a "framer had a very specific and narrow
understanding of a provision's meaning, should we ignore the fact that
he proposed or agreed to language which seems particularly ill-suited
to convey such a restrictive meaning?""227 Henry Hart scathingly commented in similar case that William Crosskey "is a devotee of that
technique of interpretation which reaches its apogee of persuasiveness
in the triumphant question, 'If that's what they meant, why didn't they
say so.' "228 Their neglect "to say so" gives way to the centuries-old
rule that the intention prevails over the letter.
There are, Saphire asserts, "even more intractable difficulties inherent in the determination of institutional or group intention. .

.

. It

is, of course, implausible to suggest that each person voting for a provision had an exactly identical understanding of its meaning and effect."'29 Saphire would remove the established reliance by Courts on
committee reports, statements by leaders, and the like to the psychoanalyst's couch.' 80 No court, to my knowledge, has ever proposed so ex-

225. Hart, Book Review, 67 HARV. L. REv. 1456, 1481 (1954).
226. 1 J. STORY, supra note 171, § 1084 (emphasis added).
227. Saphire, supra note 11, at 774-75. Leedes relies on Madison in The FederalistNo. 37
for evidence that the Framers intended "to constitutionalize broad concepts." Leedes, supra note
24, at 546. There, "Madison wrote that 'all new laws' are obscure until their meaning is clarified
. . . [by] 'adjudications,'" id. (footnotes omitted) (quoting THE FEDERAIST No. 37, at 229 (J.
Madison) (Mod. Libr. ed. 1937)), adding that "language was by its nature 'dim and doubtful.'"
Leedes, supra note 24, at 546 (footnote omitted) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 230 (J.
Madison) (Mod. Libr. ed. 1937)). More in point is his later utterance: "[lI]t exceeds the possibility
of belief, that the known advocates in the Convention for a jealous grant & cautious definition of
federal powers, should have silently permitted the introduction of words or phrases in a sense
rendering fruitless the restrictions & definitions elaborated by them." 3 M. FARRAND, supra note
137, at 488. Concretely, having unmistakably excluded suffiage and segregation from the fourteenth amendment, the Framers did not intend by the "broad" words "equal protection" to defeat
their intention.
228. Hart, supra note 225, at 1462.
229. Saphire, supra note I1, at 775 (emphasis added). See Justice Frankfurter at supra
note 122. Saphire quotes Wofford, "'Surely some members of the Convention were more influential than others . . . and presumably their intents are entitled to special weight.'" Saphire, supra
note II, at 773 n.114 (quoting Wofford, The Blinding Light: The Uses of History in Constitutional Interpretation, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 502, 507 (1964)). Leedes likewise recognizes that the
Framers' intent might be found "on the basis of evidence disclosing that influential participants in
the debates over the original Constitution. . . intended specifically to constitutionalize a particular conception." Leedes, supra note 24, at 546. This is in fact the basis of judicial review. See E.
CORWIN, supra note 122.
230. See Justice Frankfurter at supra note 122.
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treme a test. Tested by the suffrage experience, it is abundantly plain
that the vast majority of the thirty-ninth Congress shared the pervasive
hostility to Negro suffrage, strikingly confirmed by the 112 to 12 and
34 to 4 votes in House and Senate rejecting attempts to compel Tennessee to embody suffrage in its constitution. 3 1 Such are the musings
that lead Saphire to view skeptically the claims of Raoul Berger and
Michael Perry!23 2 Berger deserves to be evaluated in terms of the indisputable fact that there was virtual unanimity in excluding suffrage and
segregation from the fourteenth amendment.
Saphire concludes that "the 'framers' intent' is merely a linguistic
device [that embodies] our need to establish the historical roots for our
most basic legal principles," an "artifact" "to satisfy our sense of order
and our innate need to have those who have preceded us share our
responsibility for the world we confront. 2 3 To my mind, rather, posterity has sought to effectuate the intention of the Framers because it
shared their conviction that power corrupts; a "very basic principle of
our constitution," said Willard Hurst, is "a distrust of official
power,"234 which effectuation of the Framers' intent would limit. It
trivializes our respect for the Framers' deeply felt concerns and their
insistence on self-government that is the very essence of democracy to
attribute our efforts to curb and limit delegated power to a "sense of
order. ' 23 5 In truth, Saphire cannot bring himself squarely to say after
the manner of Brest that judges are not bound by the Constitution; but
just that is the meaning of his statement that the "historical context [is
not controlling where it] is so inconsistent with contemporary thinking
that giving it effect would generate decisions which would be widely
condemned as anachronistic or arbitrary. 23 6 Compare such speculation
with public hostility to the actual decisions respecting school prayer,
busing, death penalties, abortion, and the like.237

231.
232.
233.

R. BERGER, supra note 10, at 59-60, 79.
Saphire, supra note 11, at 776-77.
Id. at 779.

234. SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME LAw 75 (E. Cahn ed. 1954).
235. "Constitutionalism," said Charles Mcllwain, "is and must be limited government."
Mcllwain, The Fundamental Law behind the Constitution of the United States, in THE CONSTITUTION RECONSIDERED 3 (Conyers Read ed. 1939). "The framers of our Constitution were under
the constant fear of an arbitrary rule [and] . . . in their dread of despotism, they added a dissipation of authority." Id. at 4.
236. Saphire, supra note 11, at 780-81. But compare Hamilton, supra text accompanying
note 211.
237. Levinson observes that the "people do not appear to embrace the decisions made in
their name." Levinson, supra note 35, at 569. Commenting on Perry's statement that "'not many
would take issue with . . . [the] disestablishment of [legally maintained] racial segregation,'"
Lupu declares, "[i]t requires the rosiest or most disingenuous distortion to make such an assertion
in the face of the turbulence of school desegregation efforts since 1954." Lupu, supra note 3, at
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A bizarre attempt to discredit resort to "original intention" is
Judge Gibbons' claim that Berger erroneously applies "principles of
statutory construction to constitutional adjudication."3' 88 Since the common law knew no written constitutions, it had to proceed, as was the
practice, by analogy. So, in construing the Constitution, Chief Justice

Marshall applied rules pertaining to "other legal documents. '2 ' Edward Corwin commented that our early judges adapted "the numerous
[common-law] rules for construction of written instruments . . . [for]

the business of constitutional construction."24 0 Julius Goebel wrote that
the Founders were accustomed to "[resorting] to the accepted modes of
statutory construction to settle the meaning of constitutional provisions."12 41 Other commentators concur;2 42 I know of none, prior to the
activist scarecrow, to the contrary. The rules of documentary interpretation represent the deposit of centuries of experience, and, to borrow
from Jean Monnet, rules "substitute an enduring collective memory for
fleeting and fragmented individual experience." 24 And, as Tushnet remarks, they "may be crystallized expression of what more detailed inquiries have usually shown to be true." 4 A centuries-old practice is
not shaken by activist arguments for its abandonment. As said by
Thomas Kuhn, "Retooling 4is an extravagance to be reserved for the
occasion that demands it.' '
THE ROLE OF THE COURT

A lawyer who enters the world of current jural philosophers may
well think that he has gone Through the Looking Glass. The reigning
idol, John Rawls, postulates a principle of justice requiring "that
wealth, status, and opportunity are to be distributed in such a way as

THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 117 (1982)). See
also R. BERGER, supra note 10, at 327-28.
238. Gibbons, supra note 51, at 851, 847.
239. Supra text accompanying note 175.
240. Corwin, The "'Higher Law" Background of American ConstitutionalLaw, 42 HARV.
L. REV. 365, 371 (1938).

593 (quoting M. PERRY,

241.

1 HISTORY

OF THE SUPREME COURT

128 (J. Goebel ed. 1971).

242. Justice Robert Yates, a delegate to the Convention from New York, wrote under the
pseudonym "Brutus" that the Constitution is to be explained "according to the rules laid down for

construing a law." C.

KENYON,

THE

ANTIFEDERALiSTS

337 (1966). See also Jones, The Common

Law in the United States: English Themes and American Variations,in POLITICAL SEPARATION
AND LEGAL CONTINUITY 134, 101-02 (H. Jones ed. 1976).
243. J. MONNET, MEMOIRS 456 (1978). Justice Story asked respecting a federal statute,

"How is it to be interpreted? Are the rules of the common law to furnish the proper guide, or is
every court and department to give it any interpretation it may please, according to its own arbitrary will?" I J. STORY, supra note 171, § 158 n.2.
244. Tushnet, supra note 120, at 794.
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makes the worst-off classes best off."'2 46 To some, that may seem
equivalent to socialism. That frightens me less than it did the Justices,2 47 and as it will the blue-collar worker who has been singularly
indifferent for many years to the promised land held out by socialism.
Robert Nozick remarks that Rawls requires that "persons must surrender the exercise of their natural ability for the good of others. 2 48 In
homelier terms, it calls on the haves to "divvy up" with the have-nots.
It is not merely the filthy rich that would resist; every blue-collar
worker who has risen to the ownership of a home, a car, perhaps a
boat, will fight to the last ditch to hang on to what he has earned.
Much more singular is Rawls's inarticulate premise, at least as articulated by his disciple, Ronald Dworkin, that such distributive justice can
be carried out via jural philosophy by the judiciary. 49 Saphire justly
observes, "The free-spirited judge who, for example, concluded today
that the Constitution required a socialist economy would, notwithstanding his passionate disillusionment with capitalism, simply not be taken
seriously. 28 0 Charles Black, an activist Paladin, perceived the flaw in
such notions:
"The poor are indeed unfree . . . [But] reliance on the judiciary to correct this kind of unfreedom is tragically misplaced . . . [W]hat will be
wanted, and indispensably needed, is that major shift of resources, and
that systematic reorganization, which cannot succeed without very
weighty action by the political branches. The most serious single mistake
possible at this time would . . . [be] to tackle poverty by invoking the
251

judicial power."

'

Like most activists, Black glides over the even more basic constitutional
problem: Where is the Court authorized to carry through such a redistribution in a document framed by men to whom "property" was all
246. Richards, supra note 53, at 735 (citing J.

RAWLS,

A THEORY

OF JUSTICE

(1971)).

247. Justice David J. Brewer inveighed against "'the red flag of socialism, inviting a redistribution of property.'" Mason, Myth and Reality in Supreme Court Decisions, 48 VA. L. REV.
1385, 1393 (1962) (quoting Address by David J. Brewer, New York State Bar Association Annual Meeting (Jan. 17, 1893), quoted in 16 Pioc. N.Y. ST. B.A. 37, 47 (1893)). See also R.
BERGER, supra note 10, at 3 n.8.
248. Richards, supra note 53, at 735.
249. See id. at 734-37.
250. Saphire, supra note 11, at 804 n.217. Ely notes that a judge's attempt to go beyond the
purpose of a statute to enforce "fundamental values" would verge on "lunacy," and that constitutional interpretation may be governed by similar considerations. J.H. ELY, supra note 85, at 3-4,
186 n.lI.
251. R. BERGER, supra note 10, at 327 n.54 (quoting Address by Professor Charles Black,
"The Judicial Power as Guardian of Liberties," before a Symposium on "The Supreme Court and
Constitutional Liberties in Modern America," Wayne State University, Detroit, Mich. (Oct. 16,
1976)).
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but sacred?""2 The "truly fundamental problem posed by expansive review," Perry observed, is "that of authority."253 For as Maltz correctly
comments, "unless a legitimate role is posited for the Court, no amount
of argumentation regarding the 'good' results engendered by [a given]

theory will provide sufficient justification for its adoption."' a
As perceived by the Framers, the role of the Court was to prevent

the other branches from overstepping their bounds, 5 5 what James
Bradley Thayer and Learned Hand termed policing the boundaries
drawn in the Constitution. 5 It defies common sense to urge that the
judiciary, which Hamilton assured the ratifiers was "next to nothing, 2 57 was authorized to revise the Constitution. Such an authorization, Perry comments, would "have been a remarkable delegation for
politicians to grant an institution like the Supreme Court, given the
electorate's long-standing commitment to policy-making . . . by those

accountable, unlike the Court, to the electorate."' " Instead, the Justices were pointedly excluded from any share in legislative policy-making. When it was proposed by Madison and Wilson to appoint the Justices to a Council of Revision that would assist the President in
exercising the veto power on the ground that "[]aws may be . . . unwise, may be dangerous . . . and yet not be so unconstitutional as to
justify the judges in refusing to give them effect," 2 5 ' Elbridge Gerry
objected, "[ilt was quite foreign from the nature of ye office to make

them judges of the policy of public measures." 2 ° Nathaniel Gorham
chimed in that judges "are not presumed to possess any peculiar knowledge of. . . public measures"; " ' and John Dickinson said that judges

252. Id. at 266-67.
253. Perry, The Abortion-Funding Cases: A Comment on the Supreme Court's Role in
American Government, 66 GEo. L.J. 1191, 1231 (1978).
254. Maltz, supra note 143, at 624. The Court recently declared that "[t]he hydraulic pressure inherent within each of the separate Branches to exceed the outer limits of its power, even to
accomplish desirable objectives, must be resisted." Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v.
Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764, 2784 (1983).
255. R. BERGER, supra note 53, at 8-16.
256. R. BERGER, supra note 10, at 305.
257. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 504 (A. Hamilton) (Mod. Libr. ed. 1937).
258. M. PERRY, supra note 237, at 20.
259. 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 137, at 73. Alexander therefore errs in attributing to the
Framers "a perception of when unwise or unjust legislation ought to be judicially invalidated."
Alexander, supra note 81, at 452 n.26.
260. 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 137, at 97-98.
261. Id. at 74. Chief Justice Marshall cautioned that "[t]he peculiar circumstances of the
moment may render a measure more or less wise, but cannot render it more or less constitutional." JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE, supra note 115, at 190-91. Justice Holmes declared that
"It]he criterion of constitutionality is not whether we believe the law to be for the public good."
Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 570 (1923) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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"ought not to be legislators."' 2 62 Corwin therefore emphasized that
"[tihe first important step in the clarification of the Convention's ideas
with reference to the doctrine of judicial review is marked by its rejection of the Council of Revision idea on the basis of the principle...
[tJhat the power of making ought to be kept distinct from that of expounding the laws."' 26 3 Summing up, Corwin stated, "[T]he function of
judicial review is almost invariably related by members of the Convention to the power of judges as 'expositors of the law.' ",264 Perry justly
concludes that "[t]here is no plausible textual or historical justification
for constitutional policymaking by the judiciary. 2 6 5 Alteration of the
Constitution was by article V exclusively reserved to the people, acting
in prescribed fashion. 2 " The Court itself rejected the notion that the
Constitution may "be wrenched from the subjects expressly embraced
within it, and amended by judicial decision without action by the designated organs in the mode by which alone amendments can be
2 67
made.,
Time and again activists argue that the original understanding,
even the text itself, was not meant to be binding. Seldom is this stated
nakedly; instead, as Terrance Sandalow puts it, the limits on judicial
discretion "are not those imposed by the language and pre-adoption
history of the Constitution," but are "those that have developed over
time in the ongoing process of valuation [by the Court] that occurs in
the name of the Constitution."12 " For Saphire Brown v. Board of Education, which overturned the Framers' determination to exclude segregation from the ambit of the fourteenth amendment, is "a decision in
the name of the Constitution. ' 269 "In determining what the Constitution means today, courts translate into concrete form our deepest, most
abstract public values. ' 27 0 But as Ely stated, what the judge really dis-

262. 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 137, at 108.
263. E. CORWIN, supra note 122, at 42 (emphasis added).
264. Id. at 43-44. This was a major presupposition of the Founders, given graphic utterance
by Chief Justice Hutchinson of Massachusetts in 1767: "[T]he judge should never be the legislator. Because then the Will of the Judge would be the Law: and this tends to a.State of Slavery."
Horwitz, The Emergence of an Instrumental Conception of American Law, 1780-1820, in 5 PERSPECTIVES IN AMERICAN HISTORY 287, 292 (1971).
A leading activist, Charles Black, confirms that for the colonists, "the function of the judge is
thus placed in sharpest antithesis to that of the legislator," who alone was concerned "with what
the law ought to be." C. BLACK, THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT 160 (1960).
265. M. PERRY, supra note 237, at 24, 114.
266. Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 227 (1920). "It is not the function of courts . . . to
alter the method [for change] which the Constitution has fixed." Id.
267. McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 36 (1892).
268. Sandalow, supra note 124, at 1054.
269. Saphire, supra note 11, at 808.
270. Id. at 799.
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covers are his own values. 2 " Certainly the 1954 desegregation decision
did not reflect the values of the American people; the fight against segregation continues to be an uphill struggle.2 72 The Court's intrusion
into the field of death penalties in 1972 provoked an immediate backlash in some thirty-seven states; the abortion decision split the nation.
Swathing such facts in generalities does not dispose of them. Saphire's
view that "[c]onstitutional interpretation is the process by which we
give contemporary expression" to the "record of our political history"
simply rationalizes judicial usurpation.27 ' Richards phrases it more
openly: "If one should find that a reasonable construction of democratic
political theory . . . would require a revision in the forms of histori-

cally intended constitutionalism, intellectual and moral conscience
would require appropriate changes in the constitutional order. 274 Who
would make the changes? Robert Cover provided the answer, thrusting
aside "the Constitution's self-evident meaning" on the ground that
"we" have entrusted judges with forming an "ideology" by which legislative action can be measured, 7 . and it may be added, the Framers'
choices displaced. No activist points to the source of this decision to
"entrust" judges with the ultimate power to frame our ideology. On the
other hand, James Bradley Thayer, a seminal constitutional scholar,
stated that the Court "cannot rightly attempt to protect people by undertaking a function not its own."127 6 And Justice Holmes did not
"think it desirable that the judges should undertake to renovate the

271. Ely, On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 HARV. L. REV. 5, 16 (1978). Perry observes, "[I]t is a radical thing to say, and hence a thing not often said, that the source of judgment
is the judge's own values." M. PERRY, supra note 237, at 123. Such conduct, Monaghan comments, "conflicts with the core institutional settlement embodied in the Constitution and reinforced by its amendments-the constitutional scheme of representative government which assigns
policy-making functions to the political organs of government" -an "insurmountable" objection.
Monaghan, Professor Jones and the Constitution, 4 VT. L. REV. 87, 91 (1979). See infra note
287.
272. Supra note 237. Appraising the situation in the fall of 1975, Derrick Bell, a black
academician, stated that "[t]oday, opposition to desegregation is, if anything, greater than it was
in 1954." Bell, The Burden of Brown on Blacks. History-Based Observations on a Landmark
Decision, 7 N.C. CENTRAL L.J. 25 (1979).
273. Saphire, supra note 1I, at 801.
274. Richards, supra note 53, at 738.
275. Cover, Book Review, NEw REPUBLIC, Jan. 14, 1978, at 26, 27. Maltz refers to the
"simple, unalterable fact-that except within relatively narrow parameters, the exercise of judicial
review is fundamentally inconsistent with the theory of electorally accountable government."
Maltz, supra note 143, at 631. Saphire recognizes that the "values of consent, stability, and judicial legitimacy" are "central to constitutionalism and to a tolerable accommodation of judicial
review with democratic political theory [and they] remain deeply entrenched, as does the view
that they can only be respected by discovering and adhering closely to the framers' intent."
Saphire, supra note 11, at 772.
276.

J. THAYER, JOHN MARSHALL 109-10 (1901).
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law. That is not their province." 277
Gary Leedes attempts to fill the breach, alluding to "circumstantial evidence that the framers authorized interpreters of the Constitution to make value judgments that are not necessarily analogous to the
framers' own particular value judgments, '7 8 more bluntly, to interpolate extraconstitutional values. First, he cites the Framers' familiarity
with Bishop Hoadley's dictum that the final interpreter is "in truth the
law giver," and he notes that Lord Mansfield's reforms "convinced
many Americans that judges could not be depended on merely to apply
existing law."' 7' That does not add up to endorsement of a distasteful
practice. Moreover, development of the common law had been left to
judges, subject to correction by Parliament. Constitutions that limited
the branches' powers were quite another matter. 80 Against such "circumstances" there is the Founders' profound fear of judicial discretion,281 their attachment to a "fixed" Constitution, alterable only by

amendment.' If judges were authorized freely to alter the Constitution, article V was all but superfluous. In Marbury v. Madison, Chief
Justice Marshall declared that a written constitution was designed to
define and limit power, and asked, "To what purpose are powers limited . . . if these limits may, at any time, be passed by those intended
to be restrained?"' 88 He believed the Constitution to be "a solemn act

277. O.W. HOLMES, COLLECTED PAPERS 239 (1920).
278. Leedes, supra note 24, at 552.
279. Id. at 552, 553.
280. Mansfield himself differentiated the demands of statutes from reformulation of the
common law: "Whatever doubts I may have in my own breast with respect to the policy and
expedience of this law,. . . I am bound to see it executed according to its meaning." Pray v. Edie,
99 Eng. Rep. 1113, 1114 (K.B. 1786). Cardozo wrote that judges do not have "the right, to ignore
the mandate of a statute, and render judgment in despite of it." B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 129 (1921).

281.

See G.

WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC

1776-1787, at 299, 304

(1969). Leedes notes:
[T]he Supreme Court . . .is expected to justify its case rulings on the basis of principles
that appear genuinely' attributable to the Constitution. The public demands this safeguard
because "[tlhere is ... something frightening and uncontrollable about an individual who
insists upon taking his own reasoned judgment as the final authority for his actions."
Leedes, supra note 24, at 563 (quoting R. WOLFF, THE RULE OF LAW 8 (1971)). And he observes
that "[t]he problem with judge-made law is the fear (and sometimes the reality) of unfettered
discretion, which enables courts to impose unacceptable values on people." Id. at 540.

282. P.

KURLAND, WATERGATE AND THE CONSTITUTION

7 (1978). Justice William Pater-

son, a leading Framer, declared "[t]he Constitution is certain and fixed . . .and can be revoked
or altered only by the authority that made it." Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.)
304, 308 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795). Chief Justice Thomas Cooley likewise considered that "[t]he meaning of the constitution is fixed when it is adopted .
I..."
I T. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 124 (8th ed. 1927). The rule was reiterated in South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S.
437 (1905): "The Constitution is a written instrument. As such its meaning does not alter. That
which it meant when adopted it means now." Id. at 448.
283. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 176 (1803). "Of what avail are written
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of the people themselves . . . made to be preserved, and no organ of
government may alter its terms." 2 And he specifically disclaimed a
judicial "right to change the instrument." 28 5 In this Jefferson was in
accord with Marshall: "Our peculiar security is the possession of a
written Constitution. Let us not make it a blank paper by construction
S. .. If [power is boundless] then we have no Constitution. If it has
bounds, they can be no other than the definition of the powers which
that instrument gives." 28 6 For the limited Constitution was, in Jefferson's words, meant to bind down our delegates "from mischief by the
chains of the Constitution. 28 7 Activists themselves shrink from illimitable judicial power.28 8 To insist on "the law's capacity for
growth-more precisely, [judicially] to absorb or adapt to organic social changes" because of "the exceedingly cumbersome process of constitutional amendment"2 89 is like extenuating a burglar's break-in
through a window because the door was barred.
constitutions . . . if their limitations and restraints upon power may be overpassed with impunity
by the very agencies created and appointed to guard, defend, and enforce them ... ?" Poindexter
v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 291 (1885). The cases are at war with Saphire's denial that "the
Constitution's writtenness has ever been its most crucial or determinative characteristic." Saphire,
supra note 11, at 801. Resort was had to a written constitution to place the limits on delegated
power beyond cavil.
284. E. CORWIN, supra note 136, at 110.
285. JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE, supra note 115.
286. 8 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 247 (P. Ford ed. 1892).
287. 4 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 543 (2d ed. 1836).
Commenting on Perry, Lupu writes, "One wonders how and why he is willing to place so
much faith in the Court; at times, the argument is a peculiar cross between 'Father Knows Best'
and the divine right of kings." Lupu, supra note 3, at 600. Apparently Lupu is not enamored of
"judicial whim, in its most subjective, unconstrained form." Id. at 616. Not all activists are ready
to renounce the rule of law. Thus Owen Fiss considers that judges are committed "'to uphold and
advance the rule of law itself.'" Saphire, supra note 11, at 804 n.217 (quoting Fiss, Objectivity
and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REv. 739, 746 (1982)). However, as Lupu states, the rule of law
premises "that there will always be law to apply, . . . [drawn from] the principles that have
previously governed analogous matters." Lupu, supra note 3, at 616. By that test, the death penalty cases which reversed the practice of several centuries scarcely comport with the rule of law.
Precedents have fallen in droves before the modern Court.
As James O'Fallon remarks of the view that "a judge ought to decide cases according to his
own values," the inevitable "consequence is that innominate rights review is no longer law in any
meaningful sense." O'Fallon, Skepticism and Politics in the Domain of Rights, 8 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 713, 717 (1983). Lupu also considers that "the pursuit of objective, dispassionate justice [is]
implicit in the ideal of the rule of law." Lupu, supra note 3, at 616. Despite some ambivalence,
Lupu affirms that "the text generally remains as a boundary beyond which value selection cannot
responsibly proceed." Id. at 606. "Much contemporary defense of the Supreme Court's supremacy
is based more on what can only be termed authoritarian argument .
Levinson, supra note
35, at 576 n.40.
288. Ely, for example, avers that "read for what it says the Ninth Amendment seems opentextured enough to support almost anything one might wish to argue, and that thought can get
pretty scary." J.H. ELY, supra note 85, at 34.
289. Lupu, supra note 3, at 605.
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The colonists dreaded power and, Bernard Bailyn tells us, dwelt on
it interminably, centering on "its endlessly propulsive tendency to expand itself beyond legitimate boundaries."' 9*0 Understandably, therefore, Lee assured the Virginia ratifiers that every assertion of power
must answer the question: "Is it enumerated in the Constitution?...
It is otherwise arbitrary and unconstitutional. 12 9 1 Early on Chief Justice Marshall declared that the government "can exercise only the powers granted to it,""' as the Court, per Justice Stone, reiterated in 1942:
"courts, possess no power not derived from the Constitution.' 9 3 Even
the legislature, darling of the Founders, could not alter the Constitution, for as Madison said, "It would be a novel and dangerous doctrine
that a legislature can change the Constitution under which it held its
existence.' ' 29 4 Justice William Paterson, a leading Framer, said the
Constitution "can be revoked or altered only by the authority that
2'
made it." "0
Leedes is not alone in his stress on "growth." The "truly difficult
question," Perry observes, "is whether the original understandings of
important power-limiting provisions like the first and fourteenth
amendments-the plainly narrow original understandings-ought, as a
matter of constitutional theory, to be deemed the only legitimate source
And he suggests, citing
of norms for constitutional adjudication."
Gerald Lynch, that the Constitution allows for "'institutional growth
beyond the original understanding.' "297 There is no need to recapitulate my detailed refutation; let it suffice to repeat my summary of the
historical evidence. In short, the evidence establishes:
(1) the Founders' belief in a fixed Constitution of unchanging meaning,
alterable only by the people, not by the courts; (2) the avowedly inferior
place of the judiciary in the federal scheme, deriving from suspicion of
the innovative judicial review by judges who had theretofore been regarded with "aversion"; (3) the Founders' "profound distrust" of judicial
discretion; (4) their attachment to the separation of powers and insis-

290. B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 56 (1967).
291. 3 J. ELLIOT, supra note 287, at 186.
292. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819).
293. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 25 (1942).
294. 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 137, at 92-93. For the Founders this was a basic principle.
The Massachusetts Circular Letter of February 11, 1768, stated, "As the supreme Legislature
derives its Power & Authority from the Constitution, it cannot overleap the Bounds of it, without
H. COMMAGER, DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 66
destroying its own foundation .
(7th ed. 1963).
295. Vanhorne's Lessee, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) at 308.
296. M. PERRY, supra note 237, at 71.
297. Perry, Noninterpretive Review in Human Rights Cases: A FunctionalJustification,56
N.Y.U. L. REV. 278, 311 (1981) (quoting Lynch, Book Review, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 1091, 1095
(1978)).
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tence that courts should not engage in policymaking but act solely as
interpreters, not makers, of the law; (5) Hamilton, foremost advocate of
judicial review, iterated that there "is no liberty, if the power of judging
be not separated from the legislative and executive powers." That he did
not mean to authorize the judiciary to take over legislative functions is
demonstrated by his statement that courts may not "on the pretense of a
repugnancy.

. .

substitute their own pleasure to the constitutional inten-

tions of the legislature." Justice James Iredell, himself a powerful advocate of judicial review, put the matter unequivocally: within their constitutional boundaries legislatures are not controllable by the courts. And
Hamilton assured the Ratifiers that judges could be impeached for deliberate usurpations on the authority of the legislature; and (6) The States'
Rights, to which the Founders jealously clung and fortified by the tenth
amendment cannot be diminished but by plain terms, not by inferences
drawn from indeterminate phrases such as "equal protection.' '
Leedes likewise quotes Carl Friedrich's statement that in the
eighteenth century norms were considered "'the more important and
valuable, the more general they were.'"'99 Yet Samuel Adams wrote
that "[v]ague and uncertain words, more especially Constitutions, are
the very instruments of slavery." 00 One of the Framers, Rufus King,
told the Massachusetts Ratification Convention that the Federal Convention desired "to use those expressions that were . . . least equivocal
in their meaning . . . . We believe that the powers are clearly defined,
the expression as free from ambiguity as the Convention could make
them." 01 An influential Framer, Justice William Paterson, declared
that constitutions- were "reduced to written exactitude and precision."30 ' In the words of Madison, "it exceeds the possibility of belief,
that the known advocates in the Convention for a jealous grant and
cautious definition of federal powers, should have silently permitted the
introduction of words or phrases in a sense rendering fruitless the restrictions and definitions elaborated by them."808 Such statements mili298. Berger, Michael Perry's FunctionalJustificationfor Judicial Activism, 8 U. DAYTON
L. REV. 465, 526-27 (1983) (footnotes omitted). "The tenth amendment's reservation of all nondelegated powers to the states and the people clearly rules out congressional legislation enforcing
noninterpretivist decisions. . . . [A]lII noninterpretivist decisionmaking by the federal judiciary violates a value judgement constitutionalized by the Framers." Alexander, supra note 53, at 458.
Maltz observes, "Since in the exercise of noninterpretive review the Supreme Court ... limits the
powers of the states in a manner not contemplated by the Constitution, the exercise of such review
must violate this [tenth] amendment." Maltz, supra note 143, at 627.

299.

Leedes, supra note 24, at 553 (quoting C.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 217 (2d ed. 1963)).
300. 3 SAMUEL ADAMS, WRITINGS 262 (H.

301.
302.
303.

Cushing ed. 1904).

3 M. FARRAND, supra note 137, at 268.
Vanhorne's Lessee, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 308.
3 M. FARRAND, supra note 137, at 488.
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tate against invocation of the Framers' use of broad general terms in
order to facilitate elastic interpretations by judges.
The fact that the Scotch philosopher, Thomas Reid, known to
American readers, opined that "the meaning of words change over
time" 3 4 does not answer the question whether the changed meaning
can be read back into the different meaning of the Framers. And it is
hardly as weighty as Madison's pronouncement that "if the sense in
which the constitution was accepted and ratified by the nation . . . be
not the guide in expounding it, there can be no security . . . for a
faithful exercise of its power." 308 As President, Jefferson pledged to administer the Constitution "according to the safe and honest meaning
contemplated by the plain understanding of the people at the time of
its adoption." 30 6
Those who defend a grand revisory role for the Court generally
posit its moral superiority. But Holmes reminded the Court in the
Child Labor Case, "[T]his Court always had disavowed the right to
intrude its judgment upon questions of policy or morals. 3' 07 Perry, an
ardent advocate of the Court as moral prophet, himself questions
"whether the Court is as competent as Congress to divine the character
of [a relevant American] . . .tradition and consensus."3 0 8 Surely the
more inchoate "moral evolution" is not the more easily discernible. Justice, then Solicitor General Robert H. Jackson, wrote that "time has
proved that [the Court's] judgment was wrong on most of the outstanding issues upon which it has chosen to challenge the popular
branches."3 0 9 Leedes points out that "[e]quating the courts' perceived

304. Leedes, supra note 24, at 533.
305. 9 JAMES MADISON, WRITINGS 191 (G. Hunt ed. 1900-1910).
306. 4 J. ELLIOT, supra note 287, at 446. Chief Justice Marshall stated that if a word was
used in a certain sense "when the constitution was framed," then "[t]he convention must have
used the word in that sense," and that is the sense which is to be given judicial effect. Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 190 (1824). Chief Justice Thomas Cooley likewise considered that
1 T. COOLEY, supra note
"[t]he meaning of the constitution is fixed when it is adopted .
282, at 124.
That was emphatically stated in 1872 by a unanimous Senate Judiciary Committee Report,
signed by Senators who had voted for the fourteenth amendment:
A construction which should give the phrase [in the fourteenth amendment] . . .a meaning differing from the sense in which it was understood and employed by the people when
they adopted the Constitution, would be as unconstitutional as a departure from the plain
and express language of the Constitution in any other particular. This is the rule of interpretation adopted by all commentators on the Constitution, and in all judicial expositions
of that instrument . ...
S. REP. No. 21, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1872), reprinted in A. AVINs, THE RECONSTRUCTION
AMENDMENTS' DEBATES 571 (1967).
307. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 280 (1918) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
308. M. PERRY, supra note 237, at 205 n.20; see Lupu, supra note 3, at 592.
309. R. JACKSON, supra note 210, at x, 37.
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moral superiority with its legal power seems a more worrisome approach than the practice of relying plausibly on the framers' intent.
The worry is that the morally superior judge will be an intuitionist who
desires to impose a set of authoritarian ethics on an unconsenting public."13 10 It is naive, Saphire considers, "to believe that naked appeals to
moral philosophy will be understood as constitutional decision
making." '
An admirable homily, encapsulating the points I have been making, has just been delivered by the Supreme Court in an opinion by
Chief Justice Burger. a1 True, it is addressed to Congress' use of the
legislative veto, but it is equally applicable to the Court itself.
"[W]riting like a patient school master," said the New York Times,
"in familiar, basic terms,"313 Burger explained,
[The Framers divided the government] into three defined categories...
to assure, as nearly as possible, that each Branch of government would
confine itself to its assigned responsibility. The hydraulic pressure inherent within each of the separate Branches to exceed the outer limits of its
power, even to accomplish desirable objectives, must be resisted.
. . . [To] maintain the separation of powers, the carefully defined
limits on the power of each Branch must not be eroded. "
Dismissed out of hand by activists, the "original intention" is unabashedly invoked by the Court: "The records of the Convention and
debates in the States preceding ratification underscore the common desire to define and limit the exercise of the newly created federal powers
...
"I And in peroration, Burger closes: "[W]e have not yet found
a better way to preserve freedom than by making the exercise of power
subject to the carefully crafted restraints spelled out in the
Constitution.""'
The Court illustrates that it is easier to preach self-restraint to
Congress than to practice it itself. The legislative veto case rested on a
principle not really "spelled out in the Constitution." Far more explicit
and detailed is the evidence that the judiciary was not authorized to
take over legislative policy-making, let alone to amend the Constitution, a function reserved to the people by article V.
More and more the Court is acting like a qadi under a tree, dis-

310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.

Leedes, supra note 24, at 549.
Saphire, supra note 11, at 806 n.218.
Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).
N.Y. Times, June 26, 1983, § 4, at 20, col. 1.
Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2784, 2787 (emphasis added).
Id. at 2788 (emphasis added).
Id.
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pensing justice as the spirit moves it rather than in response to the rule
of law. Consider the recent legislative-chaplain-prayer case. 7
"Clearly," Chief Justice Burger said, "the men who wrote the First
Amendment Religion Clause did not view paid legislative chaplains
and opening prayers as a violation of that Amendment, for the practice
of opening sessions with prayer has continued without interruption ever
since that early session of Congress." ' By that unimpeachable test,
the Court's resort to "cruel and unusual punishment" for its strictures
on death penalties cannot stand up. From 1689 when the English employed "cruel and unusual punishment" in their Bill of Rights, through
1789 when the Founders picked up the phrase in the eighth amendment, to 1972, when the Court first discovered that death penalties offended the phrase, such penalties, with not a single exception, were not
deemed to be within "cruel and unusual punishment."8 19 Let one who
is unsympathetic to my views, Sanford Levinson, speak:
[B]oth the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments specifically acknowledge
the possibility of a death penalty. They require only that due process of
law be followed before a person can be deprived of life. . . . [a "devastating problem"] Berger easily shows that the various framers did not
regard infliction of death as cruel or unusual." 0
Nevertheless, the Court overturned the centuries-old practice without a
qualm, and now exalts the 200-year chaplain practice on grounds
which should have led it to sustain death penalties. Such are the vagaries of a Court to whom activists would confide our destinies, a Court
which exemplifies Justice Douglas' disclosure that constitutional issues
are decided on the basis of the Justices' "gut" reactions.""'
In contrast, Chief Justice Thomas Cooley, who with Justice Story,
is regarded as a preeminent commentator on the Constitution, wrote at
about the adoption of the fourteenth amendment,
A constitution is not to be made to mean one thing at one time, and
another some subsequent time when the circumstances may have so
changed as perhaps to make a different rule in the case seem desirable.
A principal share of the benefit expected from written constitutions
would be lost if the rules they established were so flexible as to bend to
the circumstances or be modified by public opinion. . . . [A] court or
legislature which should allow a change in public sentiment to influence
it in giving to a written constitution a construction not warrantedby the

317.
318.
319.
320.
321.

Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S. Ct. 3330 (1983).
Id. at 3334.
R. BERGER, supra note 86.
Levinson, supra note 43, at 248, 249.
R. BERGER, supra note 86, at 4 n.15.
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intention of its founders, would be justly chargeable with reckless disregard of official oath and public duty; and if its course
could become a
a22
precedent, those instruments would be of little avail.

322. 1 T. COOLEY, supra note 282, at 123-24 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted); see also
Chief Justice Marshall at supra text accompanying notes 283-85.
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